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ARRESTS AS REGULATION
Eisha Jain*
For some arrested individuals, the most important consequences of their arrest arise outside the criminal justice system. Arrests alone—regardless of whether they result in conviction—can lead to a range of consequences, including deportation, eviction, license suspension, custody disruption, or adverse employment actions. But even as courts, scholars, and others have drawn needed
attention to the civil consequences of criminal convictions, they have paid relatively little attention to the consequences of arrests in their own right. This Article
aims to fill that gap by providing an account of how arrests are systemically used
outside the criminal justice system. Noncriminal justice actors who rely on arrests—such as immigration enforcement officials, public housing authorities, employers, licensing authorities, and child protective service providers, among others—routinely receive and use arrest information for their own objectives. They
do so not because arrests are the best regulatory tools but because they regard
arrests as proxies for information they value, and because arrests are often easy
and inexpensive to access. But when noncriminal justice actors rely on arrests,
they set off a complicated and poorly understood web of interactions with the
criminal justice system. Regulatory bodies and others that make decisions based
on arrests can coordinate and pool resources with prosecutors and police officers, achieving a level of enforcement that neither could achieve alone, or they can
make decisions that undermine important aspects of the criminal justice process.
This Article maps different regulatory interactions based on arrests and illustrates the need for greater oversight over how arrests are used and disseminated
outside the criminal justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
Arrests are more than the point of entry into the criminal justice system.
They also drive a host of other decisions. A number of actors outside the criminal justice system, such as immigration enforcement officials, public housing
authorities, public benefits administrators, employers, licensing authorities, social services providers, and education officials, among others, routinely receive
and review arrest information. These actors use arrest information for their own
purposes and in ways that are distinct from the aims of the criminal justice system. Arrests now serve as a significant source of regulation, separate and apart
from their role in the criminal justice system.
Immigration enforcement officials use arrests as a screening tool—as a
way of winnowing down a population of eleven million unauthorized immigrants and selecting approximately 400,000 for deportation in any given year. 1
Landlords and public housing authorities use arrest information to initiate
breach of contract claims. Public employers and licensing authorities use ar1. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY
2013 ICE IMMIGRATION REMOVALS (2013), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about
/offices/ero/pdf/2013-ice-immigration-removals.pdf (citing 368,644 removals in fiscal year
2013); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to
All ICE Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for Apprehension, Detention,
and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memorandum on Civil Immigration Enforcement], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/civil
-imm-enforcement-priorities_app-detn-reml-aliens.pdf.
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rests to monitor off-duty workers, such as home health care workers, taxi drivers, public school employees, and private security guards. And in the foster
care, social services, and education contexts, arrests are used to monitor potential risks to children. In each of these contexts, it is the fact of an arrest itself—
not only a subsequent conviction—that triggers a regulatory decision, such as
deportation, eviction, loss of a professional license, or loss of custody.
With the national rollout of an ambitious information-sharing program now
known as the Priority Enforcement Program, immigration officials use arrests
to check the immigration status of every person arrested anywhere in the country. 2 Immigration enforcement officials use arrests to identify and deport certain noncitizens who come into contact with the criminal justice system, while
strategically ignoring those who do not. 3 For immigration enforcement officials, arrests function as a way of determining whether the arrested individual
falls within an immigration removal priority. Criminal law determinations of
guilt or innocence are distinct from the immigration screening process. 4
In the public housing context, 5 authorities use arrests to evaluate breach of
contract claims and to monitor entry into households. 6 Leases for publicly
owned or subsidized housing prohibit criminal activity by any tenant, household member, or guest. 7 Arrests are used as a proxy for determining whether a
tenant breached her lease and to predict whether a household is likely to cause
future disruptions or damage to the property. Public housing authorities use arrests to initiate eviction proceedings and as negotiating tools. They may use the
threat of eviction to leverage an agreement that the household will bar the arrested individual from entry—sometimes permanently. The housing decision
2. The program was initially launched as “Secure Communities.” Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities (last
visited Mar. 30, 2015). On November 20, 2014, Secure Communities was discontinued and
replaced with the Priority Enforcement Program. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski et al., Secure Communities (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memorandum on Secure Communities], available
at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities
.pdf (discussing the need for a “fresh start and a new program,” while maintaining the goal
of Secure Communities to “effectively identify and facilitate the removal of criminal aliens”).
3. I use the terms “deportation” and “removal” interchangeably, although immigration laws now typically use the term “removal.” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2013). In addition, this Article uses the term “arrest” to refer solely to criminal arrests and not to civil arrests, such as civil immigration arrests.
4. Immigration enforcement officials decide whether to flag an arrested individual as
a removal priority at the time of booking. The immigration enforcement decision is made
prior to the adjudication of the criminal charges and may be unaffected by whether or not the
arrested individual is convicted. But criminal and immigration goals also overlap in certain
ways. For instance, undocumented noncitizens with prior criminal convictions are considered immigration removal priorities. See infra Part II.A.
5. Throughout this Article, I use “public housing” to refer to publicly owned or publicly operated housing.
6. See discussion infra Part II.B.
7. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(iii)(A) (2014); id. § 982.553(b).
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may take place prior to a criminal trial and may affect innocent tenants; evictions affect the entire household, not only those who come into contact with the
criminal justice system. 8
Other examples abound. In the public employment and licensing context,
arrests are used to monitor off-duty workers. Many public employers and licensing agencies automatically receive notifications when certain workers are
arrested and booked by local law enforcement agencies. 9 Upon receiving the
notification, some employers launch their own investigation, while others reassign or suspend an arrested worker. Employers focus on their own institutional
motivations when taking adverse employment actions, including their potential
liability for torts such as negligent hiring and retention. 10 They may automatically suspend or terminate workers after learning of the arrest, making a calculated judgment that it is easier to replace a worker than it is to investigate
whether she poses a security risk.
In the social services context, child protective services may be notified
when a child’s caretaker is arrested. 11 The purpose is to provide resources for
children who may be at risk, but the notification can trigger unintended consequences. It may embroil caretakers who are innocent or arrested on only petty
charges with unnecessary and long-term involvement with social services. In
the foster care context, licensing agencies use arrests to monitor foster families
and to determine whether a household member poses a risk to a foster child. In
the context of schools and universities, arrests are used to monitor whether a
student poses a risk to others, to impose discipline, and, in some cases, to evaluate whether to offer counseling or other services to the arrested individual. 12
In each of these contexts, arrests are used as screening tools or as a relatively low-cost audit mechanism. Arrests provide a way to monitor individuals,
to evaluate whether the arrested individual falls into a regulatory priority, and
ultimately to determine whether to modify a preexisting social or legal arrangement.
In spite of the extensive effects that arrests have outside the criminal justice
context, they remain surprisingly understudied. Even as advocates, criminal law
scholars, and courts have drawn greater attention to the civil consequences of
criminal convictions, 13 they have paid relatively little attention to the effects of

8. See, e.g., Matthew Desmond et al., Evicting Children, 92 SOC. FORCES 303, 304
(2013) (finding that families with children were significantly more likely to be evicted than
similarly situated families without children).
9. See infra Part II.C.1.
10. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA’S
FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME 36-37 (2014), available at http://
www.nacdl.org/restoration/roadmapreport (discussing the role of negligent hiring torts in
background checks).
11. See infra Part II.C.2.
12. See infra Part II.C.4.
13. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era
of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790, 1800-01 (2012); Michael Pinard, Col-
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arrests—particularly subfelony arrests, such as misdemeanors. Scholars have
provided compelling accounts of how aggressive order-maintenance policing
and broken misdemeanor courts take a toll on the poor and on communities of
color, 14 and chronicled how criminal punishment and the threat of punishment
has become a pervasive mechanism of social control. 15 But these accounts—
troubling as they are—understate the full consequences of arrests outside of the
criminal justice system. 16
On the noncriminal justice side, immigration scholars in particular have
given sustained attention in recent years to how criminal law actors affect civil
immigration enforcement. They have argued that partnerships between criminal
justice actors and civil immigration enforcement officials cede significant enforcement authority to state and local police 17 and create an enforcement syslateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and
the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 585 (2006); McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic
Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW.
L.J. 795, 825 (2011); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense
Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L.
REV. 479, 494-96 (2005); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-66 (2010) (discussing the collateral immigration consequences of convictions); NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (compiling the results of a congressionally mandated study of collateral
consequences of criminal convictions in all U.S. jurisdictions).
14. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 952-53 (1983) (discussing the “process costs” of misdemeanor
court as being so severe that “[a] misdemeanor defendant, even if innocent, usually is well
advised to waive every available procedural protection (including the right to counsel) and to
plead guilty at the earliest possible opportunity”); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 297-99 (2009); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter:
Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297300 (2011) (discussing the significant collateral consequences of minor misdemeanor convictions). For a recent analysis of misdemeanor arrests in New York City, see Issa KohlerHausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014).
15. ALEXANDER, supra note 14; DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).
16. There are recent exceptions that provide a sustained treatment of the effects of
subfelony arrests in their own right. See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 14; Issa KohlerHausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. SOC. 351, 351
(2013) (noting that the literature focusing on prison and the consequences of felony convictions fails to account for the full reach of arrests); Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043 (2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Aggregation
and Urban Misdemeanors] (focusing on the processing of urban misdemeanors); Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors] (analyzing misdemeanor arrests and convictions); Roberts, supra note 14.
17. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819,
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tem in which noncitizens receive a different type of justice than citizens. 18 These scholars typically depict the relationship between police and prosecutors,
on the one hand, and civil immigration enforcement authorities, on the other, as
collaborative. Indeed, immigration scholars and practitioners not infrequently
describe themselves as working in the merged field of “crimmigration” 19—
with the label suggesting that “[i]mmigration enforcement and criminal justice

1858 (2011); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 965, 977-78 (2004); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1090-93 (2004).
18. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1147-56 (2013); David Alan Sklansky,
Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 202 (2012);
see also Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power,
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 553-58 (2001) (discussing policy
objections to various state-based measures to regulate immigration, including the potential
for discrimination).
19. The literature is too voluminous to fully cite here. Recent contributions that discuss the merger of criminal and immigration enforcement norms include Jennifer M.
Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and
Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1574-75 (2010) (discussing the “dramatic rise
in the prosecution of migration-related criminal offenses within the criminal justice system,
increasing reliance on removal as a collateral (or alternative) form of punishing crime or
suspected criminality, and the use of quasi-criminal institutions—such as immigration detention and investigatory raids . . . in what are nominally purely civil immigration investigations
and proceedings”), Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2011) (arguing
that “deportation and other aspects of immigration status are often key considerations in the
disposition of a criminal case”), Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 1281, 1288 (2010) (analyzing how federal prosecutors and immigration actors coordinate), Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the PostSeptember 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 652 (2004) (“Deportation is now often a virtually automatic consequence of a non-citizen’s criminal conviction
for even a minor state misdemeanor.”), Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration
Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469,
482 (2007) (“Just as more and more immigration violations are culminating in criminal convictions, so too are more and more criminal convictions culminating in deportation or other
adverse immigration consequences.”), Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration
Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012), Teresa A. Miller,
Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 618 (2003) (arguing that the “‘criminalization’ of immigration law fails to
capture the dynamic process by which both systems converge at points to create a new system of social control that draws from both immigration and criminal justice, but it is purely
neither”), Sklansky, supra note 18, at 202, Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006) (discussing the “criminalization” of immigration law), and Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and
the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1710 (2011) (“Crimmigration law narrows the
decision whether to shut the noncitizen out of the national community to a single moment in
time: the moment of the crime that triggers the potential for deportation or incarceration for
an immigration-related offense.”).
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are now so thoroughly entangled it is impossible to say where one starts and the
other leaves off.” 20
This Article seeks to supplement this account and to place a number of actors that rely on arrests in relation to each other. I want to suggest that one way
of understanding arrests is as a regulatory tool—a means of monitoring, ordering, and tracking individuals. The aim of this type of regulation can be quite
distinct from certain criminal law concerns—adjudicating guilt or innocence,
maintaining law and order, deterring crime, and meting out punishment.
Noncriminal justice actors rely on arrests not necessarily because they are
the best screening tools from the perspective of institutional design. Rather,
they value arrests because they are relatively easy and inexpensive to access
and because they regard arrests as proxies for information they value, such as
the potential for violence, unreliability, or instability. Using arrests in this manner can be a rational administrative decision. If done with appropriate restraints
and oversight, it can serve important safety objectives.
But using arrests to monitor, control, and ultimately reach regulatory decisions also has the potential to carry serious costs—ones that the actors who rely
on arrests are poorly situated to understand. Reliance on arrests alone magnifies
the significance of a police officer’s decision to arrest and has important feedback effects on the criminal justice system. Noncriminal justice actors who rely
on arrests may act in coordination with police and prosecutors, or they may act
autonomously. Coordination has the potential to expand the reach of criminal
justice actors. For criminal prosecutors, civil enforcement can serve to supplement, or even supplant, criminal law enforcement. For instance, criminal prosecutors who are unable to proceed with unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal
court can present that evidence in civil proceedings, which have more lax evidentiary standards. 21 Deportation, eviction, or other civil consequences can
thus serve to supplement or to replace criminal consequences.
But at other times, criminal and noncriminal law actors operate autonomously and at cross-purposes. For instance, immigration officials may deport a
cooperating witness in a criminal case. 22 Public housing officials may evict a
domestic violence victim along with her abuser. 23 Employers may suspend or
fire an arrested worker, even when prosecutors or judges determine that a rogue
police officer made a false arrest. 24 These types of enforcement choices can
undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system and discourage commu20. Sklansky, supra note 18, at 159.
21. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984); infra Part III.A.
22. See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the

Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1461 (2006) (discussing how the threat of deportation may
prevent noncitizens from reporting crime).
23. See Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377, 383 (2003) (discussing battered women who are deterred from calling the police for fear of eviction); see also
discussion infra Part III.B.1.
24. See infra Part III.B.2.
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nity members from reporting crime or cooperating with law enforcement officers.
Conflict between the way that arrests are used by criminal justice actors—
primarily police and prosecutors—and by actors outside of the criminal justice
system can arise in a number of ways. Noncriminal justice actors may focus
narrowly on their own enforcement priorities and disregard other concerns.
Noncriminal justice actors also have imperfect knowledge about how arrests
are handled by the criminal justice system. Even when administrative actors
and other authorities make good-faith efforts to avoid enforcement against
those who have been subjected to false arrests or who are cooperating with police, they all too often lack timely access to the information necessary to exercise discretion. The consequences can be particularly severe for those who are
disproportionately likely to be arrested for minor crimes and those who are unable to mitigate the effects of an arrest on their own.
In the criminal justice context, criminal procedure provides important constraints on how arrests ought to be used and processed. 25 But similar constraints do not operate outside of the criminal justice context, leaving the possibility that manifestly unfair, unlawful, or otherwise undesirable arrests may
have serious consequences. This Article describes different ways that arrests
are used for noncriminal justice ends, maps the regulatory interactions between
various actors who rely on arrests, and ultimately argues that there is a need for
greater transparency and oversight over how arrest information is used.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly discusses how arrests are
used and regulated in the criminal justice system and lays the foundation for
comparing how other actors use arrests. Part II demonstrates how arrests function as the starting point for a host of decisions outside the realm of criminal
law. It focuses primarily on immigration enforcement and public housing, and
it also examines how arrests trigger decisions in the contexts of public employment, licensing, foster care, social services, and juvenile education. Part III
examines how criminal justice actors and others interact in their use of arrests.
They may cooperate, both working together to achieve shared regulatory ends,
or they may conflict, such as when noncriminal justice actors attach causal consequences to arrests that create undesirable public policy outcomes from the
criminal justice perspective. Part IV evaluates civil administrative discretion as
a regulatory strategy, and it preliminarily explores alternatives, including re-

25. In theory, an arrest is not meant to be a form of punishment. See, e.g., Schware v.
Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) (“The mere fact that a man has been arrested
has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An
arrest shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended of
an offense.” (footnote omitted)); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948) (“Arrest without more does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity or impair
the credibility of a witness. It happens to the innocent as well as the guilty. . . . Arrest without more may nevertheless impair or cloud one’s reputation. False arrest may do that.”). In
practice, the constraints of criminal procedure all too often fall short—see discussion infra
Part I—but they nonetheless present an important way of regulating the effects of arrests.
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stricting the sharing of arrest information and exercising greater oversight over
how arrest information is used.
I. CRIMINAL LAW USE OF ARRESTS
In order to understand how reliance on arrests shapes civil law decisions,
we must first understand how arrests operate in criminal law. The criminal justice process grants broad discretion to individual police officers to make arrests,
but criminal procedure interposes an important, though imperfect, set of constraints between the fact of the arrest and its subsequent use.
This Part discusses how arrest patterns unfold, the motivations behind misdemeanor arrests, and the effects of high arrest rates on the poor and on communities of color. It also briefly describes how arrests are processed in criminal
proceedings. The following Part then discusses how arrests are used in a variety
of noncriminal contexts.
A. Arrests in the Criminal Justice System
The United States is the global leader in incarceration, 26 due in part to its
staggering arrest rate. Today, one out of every three adults can expect to be arrested by the age of twenty-three. 27 For Latino and African American men, the
statistics are even more stark. Approximately forty-nine percent of black men
and forty-four percent of Latino men will be arrested by the age of twentythree. 28 Sixty-five million adults in the United States today have a criminal
record. 29
The reasons for these high arrest rates are complex. Potential explanations
include relatively high crime rates, 30 overly broad criminal laws, 31 relatively
26. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORREC-

POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (2013) (reporting that, in 2012, approximately one out of every thirty-five adults in the United States, or approximately three
percent of the adult population, was under some form of correctional supervision—
probation, parole, or incarceration); Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html.
27. Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 (2012).
28. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by
Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014).
29. Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 963, 964 (2013). Criminal history records are defined as “identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, or other formal criminal charges, and
any disposition arising therefrom, including acquittal, sentencing, correctional supervision,
or release.” 42 U.S.C. § 14616(I)(4)(A) (2013).
30. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal Justice, 39
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 256 & n.102 (2007) (discussing the relatively higher crime
rate in the United States as compared to other industrialized nations).
31. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
703, 714-18 (2005) (describing overcriminalization as partially the product of superfluous
TIONAL
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aggressive prosecution of low-level crimes, 32 reliance on elected prosecutors
and judges who are pressured to be tough on crime, 33 and a disproportionate
media focus on issues relating to crime. 34 For our purposes, the most relevant
fact is that arrest rates are relatively high, making arrests a valuable source of
data.
The criminal justice system delegates broad discretion to individual police
officers to make arrests. To make a lawful arrest, a police officer need only satisfy the relatively low threshold of probable cause. 35 Probable cause provides a
minimum floor for when a police officer may make an arrest, but it does not
provide insight into the further question of whether the arrest ought to be
made—whether the arrest is necessary to deter crime, maintain the rule of law,
or protect communities. 36
While arrest patterns vary across localities, reflecting local law enforcement priorities, available data indicate that subfelony arrests—misdemeanors,
infractions, and violations—vastly outnumber felony arrests. 37 Misdemeanors—minor offenses, such as suspended license charges, disorderly conduct,
drug possession, and minor assault, which are generally defined as punishable
criminal statutes); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second
Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170-73 (2003) (describing and
critiquing the expansion of criminal codes); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 515 (2001) (“[A]nyone who studies contemporary
state or federal criminal codes is likely to be struck by their scope, by the sheer amount of
conduct they render punishable.”).
32. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 166-80 (2001) (critiquing public order policing).
33. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that elected judges face pressure to “constantly profess their fealty” to the highprofile issue of capital punishment); Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1101, 1103-12 (2006) (collecting examples of how judicial candidates vie to express
tough-on-crime rhetoric).
34. See Pinard, supra note 13, at 472-73 (summarizing various arguments relating to
the unique focus on crime in the United States).
35. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
36. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 776-81, 792
(2012) (arguing that constitutional law as a whole does not ensure that arrests are effective in
reducing crime, and advocating for “harm-efficient policing”).
37. R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24 (2012), available at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC
.ashx (showing that misdemeanors significantly outnumber felonies in the criminal caseloads
of seventeen selected states); R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 47
(2010) [hereinafter LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., 2008 REPORT], available at http://www
.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx (citing 2008 data from eleven states and describing misdemeanor cases as comprising an “overwhelming majority of criminal caseloads”); see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 16, at
352 n.3 (noting the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on state misdemeanor filings and citing data obtained from the National Center for State Courts to show 5.9 million misdemeanor filings compared to 1.39 million felony filings in 2009 in sixteen jurisdictions).
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by no more than one year in jail, and often punished with little or no jail
time 38—constitute a majority of state court caseloads. 39 Alexandra Natapoff
writes that in some localities, up to forty percent of the docket may consist of
suspended license cases, while other common misdemeanors include disorderly
conduct, driving under the influence of alcohol, drug possession, and minor assault. 40 In New York City alone, 35,000 people were arrested in 2012 for criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree, a crime that in essence involves
possession of marijuana in public view. 41
Law enforcement officers have powerful incentives to focus on minor arrests. Minor arrests provide opportunities to interrogate suspects, check for prior criminal records and outstanding warrants, and search for evidence of more
serious crime. 42 Petty arrests also give law enforcement an opportunity to monitor arrested individuals over time, particularly when arrests remain open for
months or even years due to delayed court dates, or when arrested individuals
agree to a form of court-ordered monitoring as a condition of dismissal. 43 Arrests can also give police officers the opportunity to respond to incentives that
have little to do with crime control—such as seizing property through civil forfeiture laws or responding to arrest quotas. 44

38. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(4) (McKinney 2014).
39. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., 2008 REPORT, supra note 37, at 47 (showing the proportion of

felony to misdemeanor arrests in selected states); see also ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL.,
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE
TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 7 (2009) (describing an “explosive
growth” in misdemeanor cases), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates
/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf; Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 16, at 1321 (noting
that in 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimated there were approximately
758,000 arrests for marijuana possession, 655,000 disorderly conduct arrests, and over
112,000 curfew and loitering arrests).
40. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 16, at 1321.
41. N.Y.C. CRIMINAL COURT, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: ANNUAL
REPORT 2012, at 31 (2013). This was the single most frequent arraignment charge in 2012.
Id. at 32.
42. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1694-96 (2010); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note
14, at 636 (“Records—checking old ones, making new ones, and transmitting and sharing
existing ones—were key to these endeavors because they helped the police sort people according to law enforcement encounters over time.”).
43. One common form of court-ordered monitoring in New York City courts is an “adjournment in contemplation of dismissal,” or ACD, where an arrested individual agrees to
keep the arrest open for a period of no more than six months (or, for family offenses, no
more than one year); if there are no new arrests in the interim period, the case is dismissed.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 2014). For a detailed discussion of how law
enforcement uses open arrests to monitor arrested individuals, see Kohler-Hausmann, supra
note 14.
44. Bowers, supra note 42, at 1695 & nn.183-87; Joseph Goldstein, Stop-and-Frisk
Trial Turns to Claim of Arrest Quotas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/03/21/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-trial-focuses-on-claim-of-arrest-quotas.html (describing evidence that police officers were told to meet quotas).
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B. The Consequences of Arrests
All of these arrests come with a cost. For the arrested individual, the process of being taken into police custody, handcuffed, fingerprinted, and held in
jail—particularly for relatively minor and common behavior—can cause significant distress. 45 This is particularly true when the arrest itself is unlawful 46 or
perceived as unfair or unjustified. 47 Arrests can also harm communities, particularly when police use public order policing strategies to disproportionately
target low-income communities of color. 48 While the proponents of such strategies assert that they make communities safer, their critics argue that they impose unjustified harm, particularly on racial minorities and the poor. 49
Recent litigation over New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy highlights the
racial impact that order-maintenance policing can have. After a bench trial,
Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York determined that New
York City police officers made 4.4 million stops in an eight-year period from
2004 to 2012, and that over eighty percent of those stopped were racial minorities. 50 While the vast majority of those subject to Terry stops were not arrested,
blacks were thirty percent more likely to be arrested for the same alleged crime
than similarly situated whites. 51
Criminal procedure is intended to place important safeguards between a
police officer’s decision to make an arrest and its subsequent consequences.
Defendants in criminal cases have the right to constitutionally adequate counsel, 52 the right to suppress evidence that was illegally obtained, 53 and the right
to cross-examine witnesses, including testifying police officers. 54 Prosecutors
evaluate arrests and independently determine what charges should be brought,

45. Harmon, supra note 36, at 778-79.
46. While emotional harm is inherently difficult to quantify, awards in misdemeanor

false arrest cases provide some indication of how significant juries can find the process of
being arrested. See, e.g., Martinez v. Port Auth., 445 F.3d 158, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (describing a $360,000 award for a false misdemeanor arrest as within the range of
similar cases); Martinez v. Port Auth., No. 01 Civ. 721(PKC), 2005 WL 2143333, at *3,
*17-19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2005) (noting that the false misdemeanor arrest involved a total of
eighteen hours of incarceration and describing plaintiff’s testimony about his emotional
harm), aff’d per curiam, 445 F.3d 158.
47. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001) (describing “gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor
judgment”).
48. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004) (discussing how mass
imprisonment harms African American communities).
49. Bowers, supra note 42, at 1693, 1699.
50. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
51. Id. at 558-60. For Terry stops, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
52. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
53. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). But see Davis v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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if any. 55 A judge must also review the facts of the arrest and determine that
probable cause exists. 56 These constraints are meant to ensure that the arrested
individual has adequate advice about the nature and seriousness of the charges
against him, the opportunity to present a fair defense, and access to a speedy
trial.
The constraints of criminal procedure, while important, all too often fail to
fulfill their intent. A defendant’s treatment in criminal court depends on a variety of factors, such as whether the defendant appears in state or federal court,
the seriousness of the arrest, the defendant’s personal background and criminal
history, the defendant’s resources, and the resources of the defense bar. 57 Prosecutors have professional incentives to exercise inadequate discretion and to
overcharge. 58 Criminal procedure also does little to address deeper underlying
problems in policing, such as arrest practices that disparately target minorities. 59
Given these dynamics, it is often easier in practice for an arrested individual, particularly one charged with a minor crime, to accept a relatively lenient
plea bargain rather than to contest charges and proceed to trial. 60 Any arrest,
including for a minor offense, can lead to a chain of civil consequences, such as

55. See Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 225
(2006) (arguing that “prosecutors have become some of the main de facto adjudicators of
U.S. criminal procedure”); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2125 (1998) (describing how prosecutors exercise discretion,
including as a result of discussions with defense counsel).
56. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975).
57. See, e.g., BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 39, at 9 (“In Chicago, Atlanta and Miami, defenders carry more than 2,000 misdemeanor cases per year. With these massive caseloads, defenders have to resolve approximately 10 cases a day—or one case every hour—not
nearly enough time to mount a constitutionally adequate defense.” (footnote omitted)); John
C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1101, 1125 (1995) (discussing the relative advantages of federal prosecutions over state prosecutions in organized crime cases); KohlerHausmann, supra note 14, at 654 (noting that on a typical day in a New York City arraignment courtroom, the court will process between 100 and 200 cases during the course of six
hours); Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, supra note 16, at 1059-60 (arguing
that defendants typically fail to receive individualized justice in the sense contemplated by
criminal procedure in misdemeanor court).
58. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862-63 (1995)
(discussing prosecutorial incentives); Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2013) (“Prosecutors have largely failed to exercise discretion and seek justice in sorting through the huge number of misdemeanor cases that the police send them, instead churning high volumes through the overburdened lower courts.”).
59. See Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
41, 48-60 (2001) (describing the difficulty in gaining data about and remedying racial profiling).
60. See generally Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117
(2008) (arguing that it is generally better for a typical innocent defendant in a petty criminal
case to accept a guilty plea than it is to bear the process costs of going to trial).
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lost work, missed school, or expenses relating to child care or transportation, as
well as the intangible psychological costs relating to uncertainty or anxiety
stemming from the pending trial. 61 These process costs—the costs attendant to
being arrested, but not imposed as punishment by the criminal justice system—
can play a decisive role in leading arrested individuals to take plea agreements. 62 A 2013 study of low-income defendants facing misdemeanor charges
relating to petty marijuana possession in the Bronx, New York, depicts a setting
in which defendants routinely take plea agreements because it is too costly to
contest charges at trial. 63 According to the report, the typical arrested individual who contested her charges appeared in court an average of five times over
the course of eight months. 64 Most of the time, the proceedings ended with the
prosecutors requesting an adjournment. 65 Due to backlogs in the court system,
these delays rarely count for speedy trial purposes. If a prosecutor requests a
weeklong adjournment, knowing that the next available court date is likely
months away, only the time actually requested counts for speedy trial purposes. 66 According to the study, the average time for a dismissal of a minor marijuana case was 270 days from the date of arrest. 67
61. PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-19 (2009) (discussing the emotional impact of the author’s own arrest, prosecution, and ultimate acquittal);
Alschuler, supra note 14, at 932 (discussing how arrested individuals make tactical decisions
to accept plea bargains based on the costs of proceeding to trial, rather than on considerations that are properly related to the objective of criminal proceedings); Bowers, supra note
60, at 1132 (describing defendants’ process costs as generally constituting “pecuniary loss,
inconvenience, and uncertainty”); Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New
York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1172 (2004) (discussing how defendants typically
return to court “three to six times before there is any real likelihood that a witness will be
called and a factual record developed”).
62. Malcolm Feeley’s classic 1979 study argues that “process costs”—“[t]he time, effort, money, and opportunities lost as a direct result of being caught up in the [lower court
criminal justice] system”—“can quickly come to outweigh the penalty that issues from adjudication and sentence.” FEELEY, supra note 14, at 30-31.
63. BRONX DEFENDERS, NO DAY IN COURT: MARIJUANA POSSESSION CASES AND THE
FAILURE OF THE BRONX CRIMINAL COURTS 12-15 (2013), available at http://www
.bronxdefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/No-Day-in-Court-A-Report-by-The-Bronx
-Defenders-May-2013.pdf.
64. Id. at 3. This statistic is based on a study of fifty-four marijuana possession arrestees represented by the Bronx Defenders who were arraigned in the one-year period from
March 2011 to March 2012 and who expressed an interested in contesting the charges
against them. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 3 (“Prosecutorial delay accounted for over 80% of postponements of hearing
and trial dates.” (bolding omitted)); see also id. at 8 (noting that Bronx prosecutors answered
“not ready” for trial seventy-five out of eighty-nine trial dates).
66. For a discussion of delays in misdemeanor adjudication in the Bronx, New York,
see William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive Trials, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/nyregion/justice-denied-for
-misdemeanor-cases-trials-are-elusive.html.
67. BRONX DEFENDERS, supra note 63, at 10; see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note
16, at 377 (describing the case of a misdemeanor defendant compelled to make eight court
appearances from May 2011 to November 2011—taking a full day off of work for most of
them—before all charges were dismissed).
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Each court appearance exacts costs. Arrested individuals may be compelled
to take unpaid leave from work and incur attorneys’ fees and other expenses.
They also face the emotional uncertainty of the trial outcome. Some can also
expect to spend a night or weekend in jail while awaiting arraignment, or they
may remain in jail for a longer period of time if bail is set and they cannot afford to pay it. 68 These consequences raise the stakes for arrested individuals,
who overwhelmingly make a rational decision to plead guilty or to accept a
form of court monitoring, in lieu of proceeding with a trial. 69 Prosecutors, of
course, can amplify this dynamic by offering relatively lenient plea bargains in
minor cases while seeking maximum penalties for those who choose to proceed
with their right to a jury trial. 70
Arrested individuals also face ongoing consequences from the creation of a
criminal record. Absent robust sealing laws, police departments and others may
widely disseminate criminal records, including arrests that did not result in
conviction. 71 As a matter of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has held that
an arrested individual has no right to privacy in his arrest information. 72 In
Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court considered whether a photographer’s due
process rights had been violated after his local police department identified him
as an “active shoplifter” in a flyer distributed to local businesses. 73 Shortly after the flyer’s distribution, all charges were dismissed. 74 But in the interim, his

68. Mosi Secret, N.Y.C. Misdemeanor Defendants Lack Bail Money, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/nyregion/03bail.html (citing a 2008 study
conducted of nonfelony defendants in New York City that showed that in cases where bail
was set at $1000 or less, close to ninety percent of defendants remained in jail for an average
of over two weeks because they could not pay); see also Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra
note 16, at 1321-23 (discussing the effects of jail time).
69. Bowers, supra note 60, at 1132-39 (discussing the process costs involved in seeking to contest a petty criminal charge); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 14, at 663 (noting that
misdemeanor defendants in New York City are much more likely to take a plea if they are
held in custody than if they are not); Weinstein, supra note 61, at 1172 (discussing the advantages to taking a plea where a prosecutor offers to reduce the charge to a violation).
70. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 1046 (2006).
71. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (holding that publicly accessible sex offender registries are constitutional); Patricia L. Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 293, 297 (2011); James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and
Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 207-10 (2008) (discussing how federal law both permits and mandates certain criminal background checks);
Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 803, 804 (2010); Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System:
Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 489 (2013).
72. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (rejecting the claim that there is a constitutional right to privacy that prohibits a state from publicizing “a record of an official act
such as an arrest”).
73. Id. at 695.
74. Id. at 696.
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employer saw the flyer, required him to explain the arrest, warned him against
future arrests, and stopped sending him on assignments to local businesses. 75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found a due process violation based on these facts. It held that the flyer “brand[ed]” the photographer as an active shoplifter, imposing the “disgrace of a criminal conviction”
without due process of law. 76 The Supreme Court reversed. In a holding that
stressed the need to combat crime by publicizing suspect information, the Court
held that while the plaintiff might have a state law defamation claim, he had
been deprived of neither liberty nor property under the Due Process Clause. 77
Every state now either requires or permits criminal histories to be released
to noncriminal justice agencies, such as those that grant licenses and provide
social services. 78 Commercial vendors also collect, store, and search arrest information. 79 A number of states make arrest information publicly accessible,
and some allow anyone who pays a fee to access an arrested individual’s criminal history. 80 And the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) fingerprint database—which was designed to provide law enforcement officials with the
criminal histories of arrested individuals—has long been used outside the criminal justice system, such as by employers who conduct background checks. 81
As a result of the broad use of criminal background checks and the widespread dissemination of arrest information, arrests hold significance separate
and apart from their treatment in criminal court. 82 An open arrest may bar an
individual from qualifying for public housing or from moving in with a relative

Id.; Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1184 (6th Cir. 1974), rev’d, 424 U.S. 693.
Davis, 505 F.2d at 1183-84.
Paul, 424 U.S. at 709.
James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 395 (2006) (“[T]here are laws in every state mandating or authorizing the release of individual criminal history records to certain non-criminal justice government agencies—agencies charged with granting licenses to individuals and firms in diverse
businesses, ranging from liquor stores and bars to banks and private security firms as well as
to agencies that provide programs and services to vulnerable populations including children,
the elderly, and the handicapped.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 2 (2006) (noting that most private employers conduct background searches through private enterprises or through commercial databases that aggregate criminal records).
79. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 71, at 185-86 (noting that “[s]ome companies have
constructed their own databases by purchasing criminal history records in bulk from courts
and state record repositories”).
80. Jacobs, supra note 78, at 395 (“At least ten (open-records) states treat criminal
conviction records as public documents; at least three states provide that any member of the
public may, for a fee, obtain any person’s rap sheet.”); Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in
the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification
Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1172-73 (1999) (noting that by 1996, every state
had a sex offender registry).
81. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 3-4.
82. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 13, at 1790 (arguing that arrest records and convictions
have led to a new “civil death”).
75.
76.
77.
78.
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who lives in public housing. 83 An arrest may lead to the revocation of probation or parole. 84 Employers regularly require potential employees to disclose
any prior arrest history, and they may consider all arrests—regardless of
whether or not they resulted in conviction—when making hiring decisions. 85
Arrests may factor into immigration decisions, such as the determination of
whether a prospective citizen is of good moral character. 86 Because arrest information is easily accessible when applicants apply for jobs, loans, or public
benefits, a criminal history has aptly been described as a “negative curriculum
vitae”—one that serves as a barrier to entry in employment, public benefits, and
other contexts. 87
Arrests thus impose significant costs outside the criminal justice system.
But as far-reaching and significant as these costs are, they constitute only a portion of the full reach of arrests. The next Part turns to a discussion of how arrests are used as regulatory tools outside of the criminal justice system, often in
ways that magnify the effects of policing and arrest decisions.

83. 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2013) (granting authority to deny an application for public
housing based on evidence of criminal activity).
84. Tonja Jacobi et al., The Attrition of Rights Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 887,
890 (2014) (describing the low standard for reincarceration following a parole violation and
noting that “unlike other arrestees, parolees can be held for up to three months awaiting a
violation hearing”).
85. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states that the fact of an arrest itself may not be a bar to employment, given that this will have a disparate impact on
Latinos and African Americans, who are disproportionately arrested. But an employer may
use the fact of an arrest to launch its own investigation. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at
1, 12 (2012).
86. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services considers the “[a]bsence or presence of
other criminal history” as one factor in the good moral character portion of the citizenship
application. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., USCIS POLICY MANUAL ch. 2 (2014),
available at http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Print/PolicyManual.html. Arrests may also
be disclosed during the process of seeking to sponsor an immigrant. See Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1654-56 (2007) (describing how certain U.S. citizens who use international matchmaking organizations are legally required to disclose arrests relating to controlled substances or alcohol as a prerequisite
to contacting a potential fiancé).
87. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 71, at 177 (describing criminal records as a “negative
curriculum vitae,” “used to determine eligibility for occupational licenses, social welfare
benefits, employment, and housing”); Jacobs, supra note 78, at 420 (describing arrests as a
“negative curriculum vitae”); see also BRONX DEFENDERS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK STATE: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS AND OTHER ADVOCATES FOR PERSONS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 3, 27-30, 58 (2014) (discussing how
background checks can present barriers in contexts such as employment, licensing, and public housing); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 1-5 (discussing the use of criminal
background checks for licensing and other positions of trust and describing how such background checks can create barriers to employment).
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II. ARRESTS OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A number of actors outside the criminal justice system use arrest information for their own ends. Noncriminal justice actors rely on arrests not because they are necessarily the best screening tools. Rather, they use arrest information because it is easily disseminated and stored, and because they regard
arrests as proxies for certain types of information they value. This Part focuses
primarily on the role that arrest information plays in immigration enforcement
and public housing. It then discusses several other contexts in which arrests
serve as the starting point for regulatory decisions: public employment, licensing, foster care, social services, and education.
In the contexts described below, arrest information is used as a screening
or audit mechanism; it is not used as a penal tool. Though the use of arrest information varies depending on the circumstance, certain similarities emerge
across contexts: Arrest information is used systemically in a process that often
begins with reporting by the local precinct. Noncriminal justice actors who rely
on arrest information may be unconcerned with questions relating to guilt or
innocence or with whether the police officer had probable cause. The arrested
individual may be unaware of how her arrest information is being used and
may have no ability to contest the facts surrounding the arrest. Ultimately, the
arrest is used as a factor in deciding whether to take some type of enforcement
action, such as deportation, eviction, or suspension or termination of employment or of a professional license.
A. Immigration Enforcement
For immigration enforcement officials, arrests provide a way of conducting
immigration screening out of every precinct in the country. In 2013, immigration enforcement authorities completed the nationwide implementation of an
ambitious program initially known as Secure Communities, 88 and now known
as the Priority Enforcement Program. 89 The program operates principally as an
information-sharing arrangement among local police, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 90 As a matter of longstanding practice,
when an arrested individual is booked, his fingerprints are taken and shared
88. Secure Communities, supra note 2 (noting that Secure Communities was unrolled
on a limited basis starting in 2008 and full implementation was completed on January 22,
2013).
89. Johnson Memorandum on Secure Communities, supra note 2.
90. See Secure Communities, supra note 2 (“[Secure Communities] uses an alreadyexisting federal information-sharing partnership between ICE and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that helps to identify criminal aliens without imposing new or additional
requirements on state and local law enforcement.”); see also Adam B. Cox & Thomas J.
Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 91-99 (2013) (describing the Secure
Communities rollout and the fingerprinting process in detail); David J. Venturella, Secure
Communities: Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens, POLICE CHIEF, Sept. 2010, at 40,
43.
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with the FBI. The FBI then checks the fingerprints against its own database and
alerts the local law enforcement agency about any prior criminal history. 91 The
Priority Enforcement Program takes this process one step further. It automatically reroutes the fingerprint information from the FBI to DHS, and DHS officials then compare the arrest information against their own immigration-related
fingerprint database. 92
Immigration screening takes place “behind the scenes” of the criminal arrest; the arresting police officer may or may not be aware that the arrest can
trigger immigration consequences. 93 In using arrest information, immigration
enforcement officials do not seek to punish the arrested individual or to investigate whether a crime occurred. To the extent U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) reviews arrest charges, it uses the arrest information as a
proxy for its own removal priorities.
To understand how arrests operate as an immigration-screening device, it is
important to understand that the United States has long had a de facto practice
of tolerating the presence of unauthorized immigrants. 94 ICE formalized this
practice in a series of enforcement memoranda that emphasize ICE’s capacity
to remove only about four percent of the unauthorized population in any given
year. 95 The repackaging of “Secure Communities” as the “Priority Enforce-

91. Throughout this Part, I refer to custodial arrests generally as “arrests.” Individuals
who are subject to noncustodial arrests—in which they are ticketed but not fingerprinted—
will not be affected, since it is the fingerprinting that triggers the information-sharing process. See Secure Communities, supra note 2.
92. Id.
93. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secure Communities Talking Points (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/talkingpointsjanuary122010.pdf.
94. David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 544 (2007) (describing interior immigration enforcement as costly, inefficient, and “unglamorous and unpopular work in the eyes of most of Homeland Security’s enforcement personnel”); Motomura, supra note 17, at 1831 (“A massive and sustained commitment of resources would be necessary—though probably not sufficient—to
apprehend the . . . 11.2 million unauthorized migrants who could be apprehended and placed
in civil removal proceedings.”).
95. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
to All Field Office Dirs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and
Removal of Aliens 2 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memorandum on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion] (“ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement personnel, detention
space, and removal assets to ensure that the aliens it removes represent, as much as possible,
the agency’s enforcement priorities . . . .”); Morton Memorandum on Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 1, at 1 (framing ICE’s prosecutorial discretion as a matter of allocating limited resources, stressing that ICE “only has resources to remove approximately
400,000 aliens per year, less than 4 percent of the estimated illegal alien population in the
United States”); FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics (last visited Mar. 30, 2015); see also David A.
Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws in
Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167, 185 & n.59 (2012), http://www
.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1119_t3ev663w.pdf (describing “ongoing policy changes meant to
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ment Program” further reflects the view that some unauthorized noncitizens—
while legally removable—are not administrative removal priorities. 96 While
ICE emphasizes that a number of factors are relevant in determining whether
any given unauthorized noncitizen falls within a removal priority, until November 2014, ICE agents under the Obama Administration were generally instructed to focus on the following: (1) those with a prior criminal conviction;
(2) recent unlawful entrants; and (3) those who had previously been ordered
deported. 97 In November 2014, ICE issued new enforcement guidance, but adhered largely to its prior stated goal of focusing on those with prior criminal
records, recent unlawful entrants, and those who have overstayed removal orders. The most recent guidelines contain a number of priorities, but generally
instruct immigration officials to focus on the following, in order of importance:
(1) those who pose a risk to national security, those apprehended while attempting to unlawfully enter, and those convicted of certain felonies or gang-related
offenses; (2) those convicted of certain misdemeanors and recent unauthorized
entrants; and (3) other immigration violators. 98
In keeping with these priorities, immigration enforcement officials who review arrests check both whether the arrested individual appears to be legally
removable and whether she appears to be an immigration enforcement priority.
ICE officials consider factors such as the seriousness of the arrest charges, the
noncitizen’s prior criminal background, and how recently she arrived in the
United States. Under the Priority Enforcement Program, if ICE determines that
the arrested individual falls within a removal priority, immigration officials are
instructed to send a notification request to the jail, asking that the jail notify
ICE before the arrested individual’s release so that ICE may assume custody. 99
Previously, under Secure Communities, ICE officials had taken a further step
of requesting that local jails hold the noncitizen for up to forty-eight hours after

focus most immigration-enforcement resources on criminals, recent border crossers, and serious violators of the immigration laws”).
96. Johnson Memorandum on Secure Communities, supra note 2 (revoking previous
enforcement guidance and explaining the need for a new name that better reflects ICE’s focus on certain immigration priorities); Morton Memorandum on Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion, supra note 95 (directing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in removing
those regarded as priorities, a practice that continues even though this memorandum was revoked as of November 20, 2014); FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, supra note 95 (discussing immigration removal priorities).
97. See Morton Memorandum on Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 1; see
also Secure Communities, supra note 2 (“In addition to criminal aliens, ICE focuses on recent illegal entrants, repeat violators who game the immigration system, those who fail to
appear at immigration hearings, and fugitives who have already been ordered removed by an
immigration judge.”).
98. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
to Thomas S. Winkowski et al., Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of
Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014) (establishing priorities effective January 5,
2015).
99. Johnson Memorandum on Secure Communities, supra note 2.
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she would otherwise be eligible for release, so as to give immigration officials
additional time to assume custody. 100
Arrests play a significant role in shaping how immigration enforcement unfolds today. As of April 2014, ICE reported that close to 300,000 noncitizens
had been removed after identification through Secure Communities. 101 ICE also reported overwhelming success in removing noncitizens who fell into one of
its general priority areas, with ninety-eight percent of its 2013 removals reportedly fitting into a stated removal priority. 102
Notably, however, these statistics do not capture how many of those removed are also criminal justice priorities. Focusing just on interior removals—
as opposed to those that occur at the border—approximately twenty percent of
those deported had no known criminal convictions at the time of removal. 103
Of those with a criminal history, approximately thirty percent had a single misdemeanor conviction. 104 Since unlawful entry itself is a misdemeanor, 105 these
statistics do not capture how many of those deported had no criminal record unrelated to their immigration history.
Why have immigration officials chosen to utilize criminal arrests as an
immigration enforcement tool? One explanation is that arrests provide an opportunity for immigration enforcement officials to expand the reach of interior
enforcement efforts. 106 Border control alone is an ineffective way of achieving
immigration enforcement. Large numbers of unauthorized noncitizens enter le-

100. The detainer portion of the program was abandoned with the transition from Secure Communities to the Priority Enforcement Program. See id.
101. Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
http://web.archive.org/web/20140910121059/http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get
-the-facts.htm (accessed via the Internet Archive index) (archived Sept. 10, 2014) (“Through
April 30, 2015, more than 283,000 convicted criminal aliens were removed from the United
States after identification through Secure Communities.”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVALS INCREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 14 (2012) (stating that approximately twenty percent of ICE removals in 2010 and the early part of 2011 were
attributed to Secure Communities).
102. FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, supra note 95.
103. Id.
104. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 2 & n.4 (reporting
52,935 interior removals of those who had committed Level 1 offenses; 26,203 interior removals of those who had previously committed Level 2 offenses; and 30,977 interior removals of those who had previously committed Level 3 offenses, and describing Level 3 offenses
as a single misdemeanor conviction); see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE COMMUNITIES: MONTHLY STATISTICS
THROUGH SEPT. 30, 2013, at 2 (2013) (reporting, without making a distinction between interior and border removals, that in FY 2013, Secure Communities was used to identify and
remove 22,561 Level 3 offenders, as compared to 18,067 Level 2 offenders and 28,683 Level 1 offenders).
105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2013).
106. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 93, at 1-2 (discussing how sharing
data with state, tribal, and local law enforcement will increase the speed with which ICE
identifies criminal aliens in local law enforcement custody).
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gally, but then overstay their visas. 107 Arrests provide a way for immigration
enforcement officials to delegate enforcement responsibilities to state and local
police, who, in turn, take responsibility for some of the work of identifying and
removing unauthorized noncitizens from the interior of the United States. 108
In this manner, arrests can be said to function as an ex post immigration
screening device. In an influential article, Adam Cox and Eric Posner argue that
states can achieve their immigration regulatory goals through either ex ante or
ex post screening. Ex ante screening is done “on the basis of pre-entry information, such as the immigrant’s race or her educational achievement in her
home country,” while ex post screening selects noncitizens for removal “on the
basis of post-entry information, such as her avoidance of criminal activity or
unemployment in the host country.” 109 The ex ante approach focuses on border
exclusion, and the ex post approach is necessarily based on deportation. 110 In
the context of undocumented immigration, Cox and Posner argue that ex post
screening allows the state to gather information about noncitizens over time
and to selectively focus on deporting certain unauthorized immigrants who are
regarded as priorities—such as those who come into contact with the criminal
justice system. 111 Arrests serve as a way of selectively examining some noncitizens for removal, while ignoring others.
This approach can also conserve enforcement dollars. As compared to other alternatives—such as street sweeps or workplace raids—arrests give immigration enforcement officials a limited and captive population to screen. If local
jails choose to comply with notification requests, immigration enforcement officials need only transfer arrested individuals from criminal to immigration custody prior to their release, rather than invest resources trying to locate them.
Politics provides another explanation. Deportation creates the potential for
backlash, particularly when unauthorized immigrants reside in the United
States long term, form strong community ties, and raise children in the United
States. 112 For immigration officials, forging a link between immigration and
107. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 1, 16 (2006), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files
/reports/61.pdf (finding that in 2006, of the approximately eleven million unauthorized immigrants in the United States, twenty-five to forty percent entered lawfully but overstayed a
visa); see Martin, supra note 94, at 544 (“Border enforcement contributes almost nothing to
the deterrence or apprehension of [visa] overstayers.”).
108. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1285, 1337-40 (2012) (discussing the benefits of delegating enforcement authority).
109. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law,
59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 812 (2007) (emphasis omitted).
110. See id.
111. Id. at 826-27.
112. See Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV.
857, 867 (2007) (“[D]eliberate underenforcement [of immigration law] is more a product of
political considerations than constitutional ones. Underenforcement . . . is the path of least
political resistance.”); Pham, supra note 17, at 968-69 (discussing the norm of underenforcement of immigration law).
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crime control can serve as a way of solidifying political support for immigration enforcement policies. This point is related to Jonathan Simon’s observation: “Across all kinds of institutional settings, people are seen as acting legitimately when they act to prevent crimes or other troubling behaviors that can be
closely analogized to crimes.” 113 In the immigration context, the link between
arrests and deportation can serve to legitimate immigration enforcement choices by demonstrating that immigration enforcement officials are focusing on
“criminal aliens,” and not on those who may be seen as having more compelling claims to membership, such as long-term unauthorized immigrants who
have had no contact with the criminal justice system. 114
Finally, the Priority Enforcement Program and its predecessor, Secure
Communities, can be understood as efforts to partner with state and local police, while simultaneously limiting their influence. Immigration enforcement
has been subject to trenchant criticism for delegating much of its enforcement
power to state and local police, whose interests may diverge from those of federal immigration enforcement officials. 115 The effects of immigration are felt
locally and unequally. 116 Six states are home to nearly sixty percent of the nation’s unauthorized immigrant population. 117 When state and local police directly enforce immigration law, 118 they have incentives to respond to local sentiment, rather than to federal immigration goals. This creates the potential for
113. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON
FORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 4 (2007).

CRIME TRANS-

114. Cf. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (1994) (arguing that at times, the law treats alienage
as an “irrelevant and illegitimate” means of classifying people, and instead looks to other
markers of membership); Eagly, supra note 18, at 1137 (arguing that “rather than two sharply divided categories of noncitizens (‘lawful’ and ‘unlawful’), noncitizen status can more
accurately be understood as existing along a spectrum”).
115. See Scott H. Decker et al., Immigration and Local Policing: Results from a National Survey of Law Enforcement Executives, in ANITA KHASHU, POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE
OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES app. G at 169, 176 (2009) (discussing variation in local police departments’ response to immigration issues); Cox & Posner, supra note 108, at 1291 (“In a principal-agent
model, the principal hires an agent to perform a task that benefits the principal. The agent’s
preferences and the principal’s preferences are not the same.”); Wishnie, supra note 17, at
1102 (discussing the potential for racial profiling by local law enforcement to skew immigration outcomes).
116. For a discussion of local responses to immigration, see generally Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567
(2008).
117. Andrea Caumont, These Six States Were Home to 60% of Unauthorized Immigrants in 2012, PEW RES. CENTER, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/unauthorized
-immigration/2-3 (Sept. 23, 2013) (listing California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New
York, and Texas).
118. Direct police enforcement of immigration law can occur through “287(g) agreements” (referring to section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act). These agreements permit police officers who complete certain training requirements to enforce federal
immigration law directly. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2013). For a discussion of 287(g) agreements,
see Chacón, supra note 19, at 1582-86.

832

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:809

local police to focus on suspected unauthorized immigrants, rather than on suspected criminals. 119 The Priority Enforcement Program can be understood as
an effort to use arrests in service of immigration screening, while also attempting to safeguard against the possibility that local law enforcement will subvert
federal immigration enforcement goals to their own agendas.
Arrests thus hold considerable appeal as a means of immigration enforcement. But as a matter of institutional design, reliance on arrests can have important unintended consequences. Arrests themselves can be unreliable proxies.
Arrest data may be linked to the wrong person—particularly when arrested individuals have common names or provide false identification at the time of
their arrest. 120 Relatedly, given that ICE’s stated focus is on identifying and
deporting those who commit serious crimes, it is important to recognize that the
connection between criminality and unauthorized immigration is mixed at best.
Documented immigrants are generally incarcerated at lower rates than U.S. citizens, 121 and the evidence is unclear as to whether there is any link between

119. The potential for abuse has been demonstrated in several lawsuits alleging racial
profiling of immigrants by police. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 82526 (D. Ariz. 2013); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Joseph Maturo,
Jr., Mayor, Town of East Haven, Conn. 2-4 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.justice
.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_12-19-11.pdf (noting that shortly after a
rapid increase in the Latino population, police engaged in racial harassment and profiling of
Latinos); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Bill Montgomery, Cnty.
Att’y, Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. 8 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about
/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf (citing police testimony that criminal arrests at
day laborer hiring sites were conducted in response to citizen complaints about the presence
of “dark-complected people” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Devon W.
Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543,
1546-50 (2011) (discussing how immigration enforcement legitimizes racial profiling by police).
120. The scope of the problem is difficult to quantify, given that many victims of identity theft are unaware of the theft. For anecdotal evidence, see, for example, Robert Faturechi
& Jack Leonard, ID Errors Put Hundreds in County Jail, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2011), http://
articles.latimes.com/print/2011/dec/25/local/la-me-wrong-id-20111225 (recounting that in
Los Angeles, more than 1480 people were arrested by mistake over the course of five years);
Dan Frosch, Mistaken Identity Cases at Heart of Denver Lawsuit over Wrongful Arrests,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/us/lawsuit-in-denver-over
-hundreds-of-mistaken-arrests.html (reporting systemic cases of mistaken arrest warrant information, based on common names or misspellings); Robert Patrick & Jennifer S. Mann,
Jailed by Mistake, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news
/multimedia/special/st-louis-wrongful-arrests-mount-as-fingerprint-mismatches-are-ignored
/html_b153a232-208f-5d0b-86a1-ba3256f7a941.html (reporting that St. Louis residents who
had been mistakenly arrested due to common names collectively spent more than 2000 days
in jail from 2005 to 2013, or an average of about three weeks each, and that one man alone
was incarcerated 211 days).
121. Sklansky, supra note 18, at 190-93 (describing trends in immigrant crime rates).
Sklansky also offers evidence that certain border towns with high percentages of undocumented immigrants have relatively low crime rates. Id. at 191.
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unauthorized immigration and high crime rates. 122 And since the majority of
arrests are for minor crimes, immigration screening disproportionately occurs
with respect to those arrested for minor alleged offenses, as opposed to the
more serious crimes that are ICE’s stated focus.
Second, the efficacy of this system is constrained by the scope of the DHS
fingerprint database. The DHS database only includes those who previously
encountered immigration officials—not those who secretly crossed the border
and thus were never in contact with immigration officials. 123 Immigration enforcement officials depict the Priority Enforcement Program and its predecessor as offering a way to conduct immigration screening on everyone who has
been arrested, but as a practical matter, reliance on arrests leads immigration
enforcement officials to overselect those who overstayed a visa, and to
underselect those who secretly crossed the border.
Third, enforcement necessarily depends on whether jails cooperate with
ICE notification requests prior to the release of inmates. Widespread refusal to
comply with detainers played a role in undermining the efficacy of Secure
Communities—a fact that ICE acknowledged in transitioning to the Priority
Enforcement Program. 124 If local law enforcement agencies continue to ignore
ICE’s new requests for notification, then immigration enforcement officials
will have limited ability to apprehend suspected unauthorized immigrants, even
after reviewing their arrest information.
Despite these limitations, arrests have become a powerful tool for immigration enforcement officials. Thus, arrests for petty offenses and arrests that lead
to no further consequences in the criminal justice system can lead to significant
immigration consequences, ones that can far outstrip any penalty imposed by
the criminal justice system.
B. Public Housing
Public housing officials rely on arrests to identify existing tenants who are
potentially in breach of their lease. Federal law provides that public housing
122. Eagly, supra note 18, at 1202 (“We still know little about the criminal propensities
of undocumented immigrants, given the obvious difficulty in counting this group both in the
offender and general populations.”).
123. Of the 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States, an estimated sixty to seventy-five percent entered without inspection, as opposed to entering lawfully and
then remaining without authorization (such as by overstaying a visa). See PASSEL, supra note
107, at 1, 16; see also Martin, supra note 94, at 544.
124. Johnson Memorandum on Secure Communities, supra note 2, at 2 & n.1 (discussing several court decisions that found ICE detainers to be unconstitutional). Detainers were
not supported by probable cause, yet requested that jails hold arrested individuals after they
would otherwise be eligible for release. Some courts found detainers to be unconstitutional
for this reason. See, e.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST,
2014 WL 1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); see also Thomas J. Miles & Adam B.
Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure Communities, 57
J.L. & ECON. 937, 963 (2014) (discussing detainer noncompliance).
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tenants are subject to eviction if any household member or guest engages in any
criminal or drug-related activity. Leases for public housing prohibit a “tenant,
member of the tenant’s household or guest” from engaging in “any criminal activity . . . that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the
[public housing authority’s] premises” or from engaging in any “drug-related
criminal activity . . . on or off the premises.” 125 In a 2002 decision, Department
of Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker, the Supreme Court interpreted
this language to permit eviction in cases where the leaseholder did not know
and had no reason to know of drug use or other criminal activity by a guest or
household member. 126
Public housing authorities use arrests as a way to learn of and enforce potential lease violations. Some public housing authorities learn of arrests by
monitoring the premises, while others regularly obtain police reports for arrests
that take place in public housing. 127
Public housing authorities rely on arrests for some of the same reasons as
immigration enforcement officials. Public housing is a scarce resource, and
prospective tenants often spend years on waiting lists before being offered a
unit. 128 Applicants are subject to background checks, income verification, and
other strict entry requirements. 129 Once admitted, tenants continue to be moni125. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(i)-(ii) (2014). In public housing, a tenant may be evicted
even without an arrest; the lease may be terminated “regardless of whether the covered person has been arrested or convicted for such activity and without satisfying the standard of
proof used for a criminal conviction.” Id. § 966.4(l)(5)(iii)(A) (stating that in conventional
public housing, a public housing agency may terminate assistance); id. § 982.553(c) (stating
the same in the context of the Section 8 voucher program). The arrest thus provides a practical—but not necessary—way for landlords to learn of conduct that may potentially violate
the lease.
126. 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002).
127. See Stevens v. Hous. Auth., No. 3:08-CV-51, 2008 WL 2857470, at *3 (N.D. Ind.
July 22, 2008) (noting that eviction proceedings were initiated after the Housing Authority
received a police report of a crime in a public housing residence); see also OFFICE OF PUB. &
INDIAN HOUS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PIH 96-16 (HA), “ONE STRIKE AND
YOU’RE OUT” SCREENING AND EVICTION GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES
(HAS) 8 (1996) (urging implementing housing authorities to promptly obtain relevant incident reports from police departments to provide for timely evictions); Regina Austin, “Step
on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”: Poor Moms, Myths of Authority, and Drug-Related
Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 278 n.21 (2002) (“Some
housing authorities rely on addresses given by arrestees and recorded in arrest records . . . to
identify candidates for eviction . . . .”).
128. In New York City alone, there were 247,262 families on the waitlist for conventional public housing and 121,999 families on the waitlist for section 8 housing as of March
17, 2014, and the vacancy rate was reported as less than one percent. About NYCHA: Fact
Sheet, N.Y.C. HOUSING AUTHORITY, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/about/factsheet
.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (2013) (requiring annual reviews of family income to ensure the
tenants continue to meet the low-income eligibility requirement); id. § 13661(c) (indicating
that admission may be denied to those who have “engaged in any drug-related or violent
criminal activity or other criminal activity which would adversely affect the health, safety, or
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents”).
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tored. They are subject to eviction if they no longer meet the eligibility criteria,
or are convicted or charged with certain crimes. 130 In this sense, contact with
the criminal justice system serves as the first step in a screening process that
may lead to eviction. The stated goals are to reduce drug dealing and to allocate
scarce spots to law-abiding tenants. 131
Arrests provide a way for public housing authorities to learn of conduct
that potentially violates the lease. This use of arrests may also be seen as a costefficient way of reducing crime. Tenants in public housing—as in other housing—are entitled to privacy, and their homes may not be searched without a
warrant. But police need no warrant if they have probable cause for a street arrest, including for minor offenses such as loitering and open container violations. It can be less costly for landlords to learn about drug use through street
stops and arrests, rather than through police warrants or gaining permission to
search a home. 132 Arrests thus give public housing authorities a relatively inexpensive tool for monitoring the postadmission conduct of tenants and for enforcing breach of contract claims.
That is not to say that public housing’s and immigration enforcement’s uses of arrests are one and the same. One difference is that crime in public housing is a well-established problem, one that motivated Congress to pass “onestrike” housing eviction laws. 133 Another key difference is that in the housing
context, tenants cannot be evicted unless the landlord establishes that a member
of the household breached her contract. In contrast, undocumented immigrants
are legally removable because of their unauthorized status alone. In addition,

130. Id. § 13662(a) (listing grounds for termination of tenancy); see also Pinard, supra
note 13, at 491-92.
131. Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 553 (2005) (“Language in HUD’s handbook
on the ‘one strike’ policy explicitly addresses the zero-sum nature of public housing choices:
‘In deciding whether to admit applicants who are borderline in the PHA’s evaluation process, the PHA should recognize that for every marginal applicant it admits, it is not admitting another applicant who clearly meets the PHA’s evaluation standards.’” (quoting U.S.
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., DIRECTIVE 7465.1 REV-2, PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY
HANDBOOK § 4-3(b)(3) (1987))); Lisa Weil, Drug-Related Evictions in Public Housing:
Congress’ Addiction to a Quick Fix, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 169 (1991) (arguing that
justifications for one-strike housing policies relate to the desire to keep tenants safe, respect
the wishes of law-abiding tenants who support tough-on-crime evictions, and prevent drug
dealers from accessing publicly subsidized homes). Former U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) official Laura Blackburne has been quoted as saying, “People
who commit crimes have no right to public housing . . . . Why should I keep some creep in
there who doesn’t care about decent living?” Douglas Martin, Innocent People Lose Homes:
Law’s Strange Twist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at B3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. See generally William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77
VA. L. REV. 881, 887-88 (1991) (discussing the costs of obtaining a search warrant relative
to other means of investigation).
133. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127 (2002) (“With drug
dealers ‘increasingly imposing a reign of terror on public and other federally assisted lowincome housing tenants,’ Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.” (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 11901(3))).
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although federal law mandates that the language at issue in Rucker be included
in lease agreements, there is no nationwide system for sharing arrest information akin to the Priority Enforcement Program. It is also considerably more
difficult to obtain data about how many evictions are triggered by arrests.
While the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) publishes significant data on public housing occupants, it does not report how
many tenants are evicted following an arrest. 134
Public housing authorities must comply with certain procedural constraints
in seeking eviction, but the procedures applied in housing court and in administrative termination hearings are distinct from those applied in criminal court. In
criminal court, an arrest report itself cannot be used to establish that a crime
occurred; the arresting officer or another witness must testify to the facts. But
housing court and administrative termination proceedings grant considerably
more discretion. Some administrative proceedings allow landlords to introduce
unverified arrest reports as substantive evidence, even without testimony from
the arresting officer. 135 And as a practical matter, tenants who are largely unrepresented by counsel have limited ability to contest the procedures used in
housing court or to mount a substantive defense. 136
In relying on arrests, public housing authorities knowingly make decisions
that affect tenants who pose no known risk to others; eviction decisions affect
the entire household, not just the arrested individual. 137 Consider the eviction
of Pearlie Rucker, one of the plaintiffs in the Rucker case. A sixty-three-yearold grandmother, she was evicted with her family when her daughter was arrested for a minor offense several blocks away. 138 At the time of her eviction,
she had lived in public housing for thirteen years and provided a compelling
example of the broad reach of “one-strike” public housing evictions. 139 She

134. The data collected and published by HUD are available at Research, U.S. DEP’T
HOUSING & URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/library/bookshelf03 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2015).
135. See Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1179-80 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing section
8 termination proceedings involving a hearsay police report). But see Edgecomb v. Hous.
Auth., 824 F. Supp. 312, 315-16 (D. Conn. 1993) (finding an informal section 8 hearing that
relied on a hearsay police report to be improper because it denied the “tenant the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine persons who supplied information upon which the housing
authority’s action is grounded”).
136. See Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM.
J. SOC. 88, 123 (2012); Matthew Desmond, Op-Ed., Tipping the Scales in Housing Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/opinion/tipping-the-scales
-in-housing-court.html.
137. This is true of evictions that are based on a household member’s conviction, as
well as evictions that are based on arrests. Martin, supra note 131 (discussing evictions of
mothers based on drug offenses of children).
138. Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781 CRB, 1998 WL 345403, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June
19, 1998).
139. Id. For a discussion of “one-strike” public housing evictions, see Remarks Announcing the “One Strike and You’re Out” Initiative in Public Housing, 1 PUB. PAPERS 519,
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shared her apartment with her mentally disabled adult daughter, Gelinda, two
grandchildren, and one great-grandchild. 140 She had no knowledge of drug use
in her household and had made good-faith efforts to keep out drugs, such as by
searching Gelinda’s bedroom regularly for signs of drug use. 141 She also had a
son, Michael, who did not live in the apartment. 142
Gelinda’s and Michael’s arrests led to Rucker’s eviction. Gelinda was arrested after being spotted with an open container. Police found cocaine during
the subsequent search. 143 About six months later, an officer arrested Michael
after reportedly observing him loitering at a bus stop. 144 When searched, he
was also found to be carrying cocaine. 145 At the precinct, Michael gave Rucker’s address as his own. 146 Three months later, and about nine months after
Gelinda’s arrest, an eviction notice was served on Pearlie Rucker. 147 The termination notice cited Michael’s and Gelinda’s drug-related arrests as evidence
of breach of contract. 148 Rucker did not dispute the legality of the arrests or
that Michael and Gelinda were using drugs. Instead, she challenged whether
she could be evicted for the off-premises conduct of household members.
The Rucker Court held that federal law “unambiguously requires lease
terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or
not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity.” 149 The Court
stressed that public housing authorities have discretionary authority to evict
tenants:
The statute does not require the eviction of any tenant who violated the lease
provision. Instead, it entrusts that decision to the local public housing authorities, who are in the best position to take account of, among other things, the
degree to which the housing project suffers from “rampant drug-related or violent crime,” “the seriousness of the offending action,” and “the extent to which
the leaseholder has . . . taken all reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the offending action.” It is not “absurd” that a local housing authority may sometimes evict a tenant who had no knowledge of the drug-related activity. 150

520 (Mar. 28, 1996) (“If you break the law, you no longer have a home in public housing,
‘one strike and you’re out.’ That should be the law everywhere in America.”).
140. Rucker, 1998 WL 345403, at *2.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Joint Appendix at 13, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125
(2002) (Nos. 00-1770, 00-1781), 2001 WL 34093958.
144. Id.
145. Rucker, 1998 WL 345403, at *2.
146. Joint Appendix, supra note 143, at 13.
147. Id. at 12.
148. Id. at 12-13.
149. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002).
150. Id. at 133-34 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 11901(2); 66 Fed. Reg. 28,776, 28,803 (May 24, 2001)).
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After Rucker, HUD issued administrative guidance that urged public housing authorities to consider a number of factors, including “the seriousness of
the violation, the effect that eviction of the entire household would have on
household members not involved in the criminal activity, and the willingness of
the head of household to remove the wrongdoing household member from the
lease as a condition for continued occupancy.” 151
In practice, the willingness of the head of the household to “cure” the
breach by barring the arrested individual often plays a decisive role in eviction
decisions. For instance, the New York City Housing Authority termination of
tenancy procedures provide that a hearing officer may allow a tenant to continue to reside in a complex, subject to the “permanent exclusion” of the arrested
individual, in lieu of an eviction. 152
Arrests give public housing authorities a credible basis for threatening
eviction. They also provide leverage in obtaining concessions from households,
such as an agreement that the tenant will bar the arrested individual from entry.
Such stipulations give landlords more control over who enters an apartment
than they would otherwise have, and may be far more common than termination proceedings. 153 A typical lease may bar those who are not listed as occupants from residing in an apartment, but it will not restrict who may visit. In
contrast, stipulations may bar the arrested individual from merely entering a
dwelling for any reason. 154
In the housing context, the use of arrests as a screening device can in some
circumstances satisfy important safety goals. But reliance on arrests can lead to
significant and undesirable consequences for an entire household, particularly
when tenants lack adequate opportunity to explain why an arrest should not
lead to ongoing monitoring or eviction.
C. Other Contexts
A number of other actors also rely on arrest information as a way of
screening and monitoring arrested individuals, including employers, professional license providers, foster care agencies, social services providers, and educational providers.

151. Letter from Michael M. Liu, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
to Pub. Hous. Dirs. (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/regs/rucker
6jun2002.pdf.
152. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., Termination of Tenancy Procedures 2-3 (1997) (on file with
author).
153. See Letter from James M. Branden, Chair, Criminal Justice Operations Comm.,
N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, to John B. Rhea, Chairman, N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. (Jan. 11, 2011), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071995-RecommendationsreTermination
ofTenancyProceedings.pdf (citing statistics that over half of all cases in 2007 were resolved
by stipulation, rather than through a hearing).
154. See id. (discussing the need to explain “permanent exclusion” to tenants who
choose to enter stipulations to remain in public housing).
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1. Employment
Employers and professional licensing authorities can use arrest information
to monitor off-duty workers. The vast majority of employers require at least
some employees to undergo background checks as a condition of employment. 155 A significant number of employers now also receive notifications
whenever an employee is arrested and fingerprinted. 156 Every state has a criminal justice repository that maintains databases of fingerprints and criminal records, including the fingerprints of certain public employees or licensees. 157 If
an employee is later arrested, her fingerprints are sent to the state law enforcement repository during the booking process, which then may automatically notify the employer or licensing agency. 158
In New York, arrest data are automatically transmitted to dozens of public
employers and licensing authorities, such as the New York City Department of
Education, New York State Department of Education, New York City Taxi and
Limousine Commission, and others. 159 Home health care workers, security

155. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 85, at 6 (“In one survey, a
total of 92% of responding employers stated that they subjected all or some of their job candidates to criminal background checks. Employers have reported that their use of criminal
history information is related to ongoing efforts to combat theft and fraud, as well as heightened concerns about workplace violence and potential liability for negligent hiring. Employers also cite federal laws as well as state and local laws as reasons for using
criminal background checks.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Devah Pager, The Mark of a
Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 (2003) (discussing the effect of a criminal record on
barriers to employment).
156. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics, WASH. POST (Dec.
22, 2007), http://wapo.st/1xunkJZ (discussing the FBI’s “‘rap-back’ service, under which
employers could ask the FBI to keep employees’ fingerprints in the database, subject to state
privacy laws, so that if that [sic] employees are ever arrested or charged with a crime, the
employers would be notified”).
157. Jacobs, supra note 78, at 393 (“Every U.S. state has a state-level agency charged
with maintaining databases of rap sheets and fingerprints. In New York, for example, that
agency is called the Division of Criminal Justice Services. The corresponding California
agency is the California Department of Justice, California Justice Information Services Division.” (footnote omitted)).
158. For a list of reporting requirements in New York State, see, for example, LEGAL
ACTION CTR., NEW YORK STATE: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING SURVEY (2006), available at
http://lac.org/doc_library/lac/publications/Occupational%20Licensing%20Survey%202006
.pdf; N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Use and Dissemination Agreement 5 (2009)
(on file with author) (stating that the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) agrees to
retain “non-criminal applicant fingerprint cards in its files for the purpose of issuing reports
to the User Agency upon the subsequent arrest of the subjects of the retained fingerprint
cards”).
159. New York City Governmental Agencies Having Use and Dissemination Agreements with New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (on file with author); New
York State Governmental Agencies Having Use and Dissemination Agreements with New
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (on file with author). This information was
obtained in response to a Freedom of Information Law request to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. The author thanks Paul Keefe of the Community Service
Society of New York.
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guards, and taxi drivers are among those whose employers or license providers
may automatically be notified of an arrest. Neither the arresting officer nor the
jail has a role in initiating the notification, so the arrested individual will not be
informed of the notification at the time of her arrest.
The transmission occurs once and contains limited information. In New
York, the notification contains the arrested individual’s identifying information,
the date and location of the arrest, the arrest charges (as listed by the arresting
officer), and the penal code section relating to the arrest; the transmission does
not contain the alleged factual basis for the arrest. 160
Licensing authorities and employers have considerable discretion in deciding how to proceed after learning of an arrest. 161 Some employers use arrest
notifications in tandem with self-reporting requirements. 162 Failure to comply
with this self-reporting requirement may itself be the basis of employee discipline or termination. 163
Some employers suspend or terminate at-will employees based on the arrest. As a matter of due process, a licensee may be entitled to a hearing before a
license is revoked, but not necessarily before an unpaid license suspension. 164
Until 2006, New York City taxi drivers, for instance, had their licenses automatically suspended for a wide range of arrests, including misdemeanor welfare fraud or forgery. 165 Employers also vary in terms of how they disseminate
arrest information. The New York City Department of Education, for instance,
disseminates employee arrest information to the general counsel’s office, human resources, the district superintendent, and to the Special Commissioner of
Investigation. 166 Some arrested individuals will never know that they were
screened because their employer might take no immediate action—but the em-

160. Nnebe v. Daus, 665 F. Supp. 2d 311, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing the transmission process from the DCJS in the context of a lawsuit challenging automatic license
suspensions of arrested taxi drivers), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 644 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.
2011).
161. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 85, at 12 (“An arrest, however, may in some circumstances trigger an inquiry into whether the conduct underlying the
arrest justifies an adverse employment action.”); cf. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932
(1997) (“On the other side of the balance, the State has a significant interest in immediately
suspending, when felony charges are filed against them, employees who occupy positions of
great public trust and high public visibility, such as police officers.”).
162. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., C-105, BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF PEDAGOGICAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPLICANTS AND PROCEDURES IN CASES OF THE ARREST OF EMPLOYEES
7 (2003), available at http://docs.nycenet.edu/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-55/C-105.pdf
(discussing self-reporting requirements).
163. Id.
164. Nnebe, 644 F.3d at 159 (“[W]e think that in any given case, an arrest for a felony
or serious misdemeanor creates a strong government interest in ensuring that the public is
protected in the short term, prior to any hearing [for an arrested taxi driver].”); see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Qualified Immunity: § 1983 Litigation in the Public Employment Context, 21
TOURO L. REV. 551, 553-54 (2005).
165. Nnebe, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 316-17.
166. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 162, at 7-8.
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ployer may consider the arrest at a later date when making decisions about
whom to promote or terminate.
Depending on the circumstances, an employee might be asked to explain
the arrest, or she may be suspended pending the disposition. 167 Employers may
have an interest in suspending or reassigning workers because they are concerned about liability for negligence claims—such as negligent hiring and retention—if they do nothing after learning of an arrest. 168
Like immigration enforcement officials and public housing authorities,
employers and licensing agencies use arrests as one potential monitoring tool.
They could also rely on a number of other methods. For instance, they could
rely on subjective methods, such as the complaints of other workers, or more
objective methods, such as a drug screening. When employers rely on these
types of methods, they have incentives to ensure fairness and compliance with
antidiscrimination laws. If an employer relies on drug screening, for instance, it
cannot disproportionately target minorities. But when employers and licensing
authorities rely on arrests, they leave front-end decisions about whom to screen
to the police, without similar regard for racially disparate impact. Employers
may also treat arrests as independently reliable, rather than engage in their own
investigation. Reliance on arrests carries the risk that the arrest will be an unreliable proxy, for reasons relating to the inaccuracy of the arrest itself or because
the arrest does not correlate to characteristics that the employer values. And
even if arrests are a reasonable proxy, they might nonetheless be overly broad
and unfairly exclude qualified employees. 169
When employers and licensing agencies rely on arrests, they might be motivated by rational interests, such as the desire to prevent harm to third parties
and others who rely on their services. But without appropriate checks, their use
of arrests can result in significant harm, including lengthy unpaid suspensions
for workers who were unlawfully arrested or pose no security risk.
2. Child protective services
Some police departments now have protocols in place for notifying social
services after a custodial parent’s arrest. 170 As a matter of due process, police
167. Id. at 8.
168. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 38.
169. A recent class action lawsuit against the U.S. Census Bureau raises some of these

concerns. The plaintiffs allege that the Census Bureau’s practice of requiring applicants
“who have ever been arrested to produce within 30 days the ‘official court documentation’
for any and all of their arrests—regardless of whether a conviction resulted, the nature of the
arrest, its relationship to the job, or when it took place”—eliminated ninety-three percent of
applicants from eligibility and had a significantly adverse impact on Latinos and African
Americans, who are disproportionately arrested as compared to whites. Second Amended
Class Action Complaint at 1-2, Houser v. Blank, 10-cv-3105 (FM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,
2012).
170. See CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, POST GUIDELINES
FOR CHILD SAFETY: WHEN A CUSTODIAL PARENT OR GUARDIAN IS ARRESTED 5 (2008), avail-
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have a relatively minimal obligation to provide for the immediate safety of
children if they are aware that children may experience harm as a result of their
caretaker’s arrest. 171 But due in part to a growing awareness of how parental
arrests can affect children, some police departments have expanded their efforts
to address the needs of potentially vulnerable children after a caretaker’s arrest.
Rising arrest rates have had a devastating effect on families. Between 1991
and 2007, the number of parents in prison increased by close to eighty percent. 172 During the same period, the number of children whose mothers were
imprisoned increased by 131%. 173 Since a majority of incarcerated mothers—
and a significant minority of incarcerated fathers—live with their children at
the time of their arrest, 174 their arrests can have an immediate impact on minor
children. 175
Some local law enforcement officials have responded by taking measures
to notify social services in the case of a known caretaker’s arrest. 176 The notification seeks to ensure that children are left with adequate care while the caretaker is in police custody. This type of notification can provide a critically important early warning sign that a child might be at risk. Like most parents, ararrested caretakers may have no plan in place for care of their minor children in
case of an arrest. They may be unable to arrange for care after they have been
taken into custody. Or they may be unwilling to discuss the need for a caretaker
with the police, out of fear that their custody will be threatened.
able at http://www.post.ca.gov/Publications/pdf/child_safety.pdf; DONNA PENCE & CHARLES
WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE
RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3 (1992), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov
/pubs/usermanuals/law/lawc.cfm; GINNY PUDDEFOOT & LISA K. FOSTER, CAL. RESEARCH
BUREAU, CRB 07-006, KEEPING CHILDREN SAFE WHEN THEIR PARENTS ARE ARRESTED: LOCAL APPROACHES THAT WORK app. 2 at 45 (2007), available at http://www.library.ca.gov
/crb/07/07-006.pdf; Responses to Children During a Parent’s Arrest, 29 CHILD. L. PRAC. 30,
30-31 (2010).
171. See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that the
“unjustified and arbitrary refusal of police officers to lend aid to children endangered by the
performance of official duty . . . indisputably breaches the Due Process Clause” where that
refusal “ultimately results in physical and emotional injury to the children”).
172. LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PARENTS IN
PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1 (2010).
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id. at 4. An estimated 35.5% of fathers lived with their minor children in the month
before their arrest, and an estimated 42.4% of fathers lived with their children immediately
prior to incarceration. See id. at 4 tbl.7.
175. Roberts, supra note 48, at 1284 (“Incarcerating mothers tends to upset family life
even more because inmate mothers were usually the primary caretakers of their children before entering prison.”).
176. See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., WHEN A PARENT IS INCARCERATED: A PRIMER FOR
SOCIAL WORKERS 6 (2011) (noting that “[t]he potential for harm can be tragic” when local
law enforcement officers fail to coordinate with social services and locate caregivers at the
time of a parent’s arrest); CLARE M. NOLAN, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, CRB 03-011, CHILDREN OF ARRESTED PARENTS: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE THEIR SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 20
(2003), available at https://www.library.ca.gov/crb/03/11/03-011.pdf (discussing notification
protocols for law enforcement officers to follow when a child’s caretaker is arrested).
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Reporting of arrests in the child protective services context is intended to
provide timely information about whether a child is at risk for neglect. But even
this compelling use of arrests can carry serious unintended consequences. An
arrest that leads to nothing further in the criminal justice system may lead to
lasting and unnecessary involvement with child protective services. Parents
who are good caretakers, and who are arrested for minor offenses, may run the
risk of having their custody disrupted. Consider the case of Penelope Harris,
who was arrested after police discovered a third of an ounce of marijuana in her
apartment. As a result of her arrest and the attendant notification to social services, her ten-year-old son was placed in another home for over a week, and her
niece, who lived with her as a foster child, was removed from her care and
placed in another foster home for over a year. 177 Arrests thus may exacerbate
harmful effects of contact with the criminal justice system on children and may
unnecessarily disrupt custody arrangements.
3. Foster care
In the foster care context, arrests are used to determine whether a household is a good placement for a foster child. Licensing agencies use initial background checks to determine whether a household will be a safe placement for a
foster child. Some states require that adult household members submit to background checks, while others require background checks of even some juvenile
household members. 178 A household member’s subsequent arrest can trigger a
reevaluation of whether the family remains a good placement. For the foster
care system, the intent is to monitor households and prevent mistreatment of
foster children, who are uniquely vulnerable to high rates of abuse and neglect. 179 This type of notification can be particularly valuable when licensing
agencies have insufficient funding or resources to conduct in-home inspections. 180 The use of arrests can provide an early warning sign that a home is potentially unsafe for a child, but as with the social services context, it carries the
risk of overbroad identifications.
177. Mosi Secret, No Cause for Marijuana Case, but Enough for Child Neglect, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/nyregion/parents-minor
-marijuana-arrests-lead-to-child-neglect-cases.html (describing the case of Penelope Harris).
178. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR PROSPECTIVE FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 4 n.10 (2011), available at https://www.childwelfare
.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/background.pdf (“Missouri and New Hampshire require checks of all persons age 17 and older. Alaska, Connecticut, and Washington require
checks of all persons age 16 and older. Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Texas require
checks of all persons age 14 and older. Oklahoma requires a check of juvenile justice records
for any child age 13 or older.”).
179. Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of
Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 205-07 (1988)
(citing statistics that foster children are found to suffer from abuse and neglect at disproportionately high rates).
180. See id. at 208-14 (discussing systemic agency failures to provide adequate monitoring and oversight of children in foster care).
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4. Education
Similar to how arrests operate in the social services context, police departments may notify schools about a juvenile’s contact with the criminal justice
system. Some notifications are statutorily mandated, 181 while others are discretionary. 182 The notification may be motivated by the desire to protect other students or to identify the need for counseling or other interventions. But it may
also have the effect of stigmatizing the student and undermining the confidentiality of juvenile justice proceedings. Arrested students whose identities are disclosed may be subject to lasting stigma—precisely the result that sealing laws
in the juvenile justice context are designed to guard against. 183
D. Conclusion
In a variety of settings, noncriminal actors rely on arrests as a means of
achieving their own regulatory agendas. This use of arrests can serve important
societal interests. But it can come at a significant cost. It can magnify the effect
of unwise or unjustified policing and arrest decisions. Across a number of settings, arrests are an overbroad and imperfect proxy for the information that
noncriminal justice actors value. This fact, combined with inadequate oversight
and a lack of transparency in how arrest information is used, can create serious
consequences for arrested individuals—ones that far outstrip any penalty imposed by the criminal justice system. In the next Part, I explore how criminal
justice actors interact with others when they both rely on arrest information as
the starting point for their enforcement decisions.
III. ARRESTS, REGULATORY COOPERATION, AND REGULATORY CONFLICT
When actors outside the criminal justice system rely on arrests, they have
feedback effects on the criminal justice system. One potential effect is to expand the enforcement powers of both actors. When criminal justice actors cooperate with others, they can engage in coordinated prosecutions that effectively circumvent the checks of criminal procedure. Collaboration can provide
opportunities for interrogation and enforcement that neither agency alone
would be able to achieve.
181. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233h (2014) (requiring that the municipal police
department notify the superintendent of schools within one business day if an enrolled student aged seven through twenty is arrested for certain offenses); Packer v. Bd. of Educ., 717
A.2d 117, 121 & n.4, 122 (Conn. 1998).
182. See, e.g., Thompson v. Barnes, 200 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. 1972) (discussing an
officer’s decision to notify school officials of a student’s off-campus arrest for alcohol possession).
183. Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should
Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 527-28 (2004)
(discussing the case of a student whose identity was protected in juvenile court but who was
stigmatized by expulsion after a marijuana arrest).
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At other times, however, noncriminal justice actors can work against certain criminal law enforcement goals. Conflict can potentially arise when noncriminal justice actors attach causal consequences to arrests that criminal justice actors do not seek or desire—such as when they deport, evict, or discipline
individuals after a demonstrably unlawful arrest. These consequences can undermine the aims of prosecutors and police who seek to encourage witnesses to
come forward and report crime. This Part describes how criminal justice actors
and others interact in their use of arrest information and discusses the implications of these interactions for arrested individuals.
A. Cooperative Relationships
Criminal law actors and other actors may have shared regulatory interests
and may choose to coordinate enforcement actions to their mutual benefit. Consider the context of immigration enforcement. Both immigration enforcement
officials and criminal law actors have a shared interest in identifying a “criminal alien”—someone who has committed criminal offenses and who is deportable. 184 As a result of coordinated enforcement efforts, unlawful entrants are
regularly criminally prosecuted prior to being deported, and a range of criminal
convictions result in mandatory deportation. 185
Collaboration provides opportunities for agencies to pool resources and
achieve levels of enforcement that neither would be able to achieve alone. 186 In
the immigration context, state and local police engage in raids and arrests in
coordination with immigration enforcement officials, 187 work with local police
to identify suspected “criminal aliens,” such as gang members, 188 and conduct
184. In practice, the label “criminal alien” encompasses a variety of statuses. See Eagly,
supra note 18, at 1137-40.
185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2013) (making unlawful entry a misdemeanor); id. § 1546(a)
(criminalizing the possession or use of a false immigration document); 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)
(2013) (criminalizing false representation of a Social Security number); Legomsky, supra
note 19, at 476-78.
186. For a discussion of this general dynamic, see Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 211 (2015).
187. Julia Preston, Immigration Officials Arrest More than 3,100, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/us/immigration-officials-arrest-more-than-3100
.html (discussing an operation by ICE that “involved arrests in all 50 states and was coordinated with the local and state police”).
188. See National Gang Unit: Operation Community Shield, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/community-shield (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (describing Operation Community Shield, which is aimed at “[i]dentify[ing] violent street gangs and
develop[ing] intelligence on their membership, associates, criminal activities and international movements” and “[s]eek[ing] prosecution and/or removal of alien gang members from
the United States”). For a critique of Operation Community Shield, see Jennifer M. Chacón,
Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member,”
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 320 (“No uniform legal standards govern the identification of
criminal street gang members for purposes of ICE enforcement, and while the ‘associates’ of
criminal street gang members are often removed, there are no legal standards defining who
constitutes an associate of a criminal street gang member.”).

846

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:809

immigration screening out of prisons and jails. 189 Criminal prosecutors rely on
evidence gathered by immigration officials and conduct interrogations out of
civil immigration detention facilities. 190 This allows criminal prosecutors to rely on deportation as a way to punish crime or suspected criminality, and to minimize the possibility that an unauthorized alien will commit repeat crimes over
time. 191
The merger of certain aspects of immigration enforcement with criminal
law—which Stephen Legomsky has aptly described as “asymmetric” in its incorporation of enforcement norms but its rejection of procedural constraints—
gives criminal law and immigration actors the opportunity to coordinate to
achieve maximum enforcement. 192 As Ingrid Eagly has demonstrated, certain
criminal justice and immigration law actors engage in extensive coordination,
from investigation, to arrest, to prosecution. 193 For instance, immigration officers may deliberately elicit incriminating statements without Miranda warnings,
knowing that those statements might subsequently be admitted in criminal
court. 194 Criminal law enforcement officers may decide to collect evidence unlawfully because they are aware that such evidence may be admitted in removal
proceedings, regardless of whether it would be suppressed in criminal court. 195
Given their relatively lax procedural standards, immigration courts provide an
alternative forum for proceeding against a noncitizen when prosecutors lack the
evidence needed in criminal court. Noncitizen defendants in practice must nav189. Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice
.gov/criminal-alien-program (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
190. See Eagly, supra note 19, at 1308-17.
191. Chacón, supra note 19, at 1574-75.
192. Legomsky, supra note 19, at 472 (“Rather than speak of importation of the criminal justice model [to immigration enforcement], then, a more fitting observation would be
that immigration law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of
the criminal enforcement model while rejecting the criminal adjudication model in favor of a
civil regulatory regime.”); see also David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History
in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (“[T]he government invokes administrative processes to control, precisely so that it can avoid the guarantees associated with the criminal process.”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through
Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 146-47 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview
.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/135_Chacon.pdf (discussing due process concerns involved in the Postville prosecutions and in Operation Streamline).
193. Eagly, supra note 19, at 1294, 1299-300.
194. Id. at 1309-10 (providing examples of evidence obtained by immigration officers
being used in criminal proceedings).
195. The Supreme Court has held that since “a deportation hearing is intended to provide a streamlined determination of eligibility to remain in this country, nothing more,” unlawfully obtained evidence can be admitted. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039
(1984). There are limited exceptions to this rule, such as in the case of “egregious” Fourth
Amendment violations. See Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread
Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1125 (discussing different standards for
“egregiousness”); see also Chacón, supra note 19, at 1615-19 (describing how LopezMendoza and other developments may incentivize state and local law enforcement officers to
disregard certain procedural protections).
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igate both systems at once. 196 Their status as noncitizens can adversely affect
their treatment in criminal court, such as by leading to the denial of bail. 197
Likewise, the existence of a criminal prosecution may adversely affect a noncitizen’s treatment in removal proceedings. 198
Similar dynamics operate in other contexts. A public housing tenant who
fails to list all occupants in her apartment, or who fails to report an increase in
her income, may not only be evicted, but also face criminal prosecution for
crimes such as larceny and filing a false instrument. 199 In the social services
context, administrative agencies may mandate home inspections as a condition
of receiving aid. If evidence of drug use or other legal violations is discovered
during the inspection, that discovery may then form the basis for a criminal
prosecution. 200 Some state and local laws further facilitate collaboration. For
instance, New York City allows criminal prosecutors to present evidence and
seek evictions directly in housing court, even if a landlord refuses to proceed
against a tenant. 201
Civil proceedings provide no access to free court-appointed counsel, no
protection against self-incrimination, and generally apply less stringent procedural standards than criminal court. Those who appear pro se and who testify
run the risk that their testimony will be used against them in a later criminal
proceeding.
Collaboration between noncriminal and criminal justice actors can lead to
important changes in the behavior of both actors. It may modify the way that
criminal justice actors conduct interrogations, and it may give criminal justice
actors incentives to gather unlawful evidence. The threat of a serious noncrimi196. See Eagly, supra note 19, at 1306-07.
197. Chin, supra note 19, at 1423-24.
198. Eagly, supra note 19, at 1305-20 (discussing how hybrid criminal and immigration

prosecutions adversely affect noncitizen outcomes across a variety of contexts).
199. McGregor Smyth, Bridging the Gap: A Practical Guide to Civil-Defender Collaboration, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 56, 56 (2003) (discussing the case of a client named
“Vicky G.”).
200. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971) (“The home visit is not a criminal investigation, [and] does not equate with a criminal investigation . . . . [I]f the visit should, by
chance, lead to the discovery of fraud and a criminal prosecution should follow, . . . that is a
routine and expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than that which necessarily
ensues upon any other discovery by a citizen of criminal conduct.”).
201. New York City’s Narcotics Eviction Program allows police officers and prosecutors to pursue an eviction directly after obtaining a warrant for a home search if the landlord
elects not to initiate eviction proceedings on his or her own. Escalera v. N.Y. Hous. Auth.,
924 F. Supp. 1323, 1330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing how the “Bawdy House” laws have
been used by the Narcotics Eviction Program to lead to speedy evictions). For a discussion
of the Narcotics Eviction Program, see Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New York City Public Housing, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 415,
425 (2006) (describing the New York Police Department’s Anti-Narcotics Strike Force as
receiving funding to “support special prosecution activities primarily to evict tenants with
drug arrests”); Scott Duffield Levy, Note, The Collateral Consequences of Seeking Order
Through Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction Program, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
539, 545 (2008).
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nal action—such as eviction or deportation—also gives prosecutors additional
leverage in plea negotiations. Similarly, noncriminal justice actors may have
incentives to conduct search and interrogation operations they would not otherwise engage in, with the knowledge that their actions could be of use in criminal proceedings—even if they will not be used in any other proceedings.
Dynamics such as these produce considerable benefits for local law enforcement officers who coordinate with noncriminal enforcement agencies.
They effectively expand the scope of each actor’s regulatory power by allowing
access to additional personnel, more easily introduced evidence, and alternative
forums for enforcement.
B. Conflicting Interactions
Just as criminal justice actors may cooperate with other actors, they may
also come into conflict. Conflict arises because each institutional actor has its
own regulatory agenda and its own goals. While some conflict is inevitable
when different agencies pursue their own agendas, conflict can be particularly
problematic in certain circumstances, such as when a crime victim or cooperating witness faces a steep civil consequence as an unforeseen result of an arrest.
That is not to say that conflict is problematic from the perspective of local
law enforcement whenever an arrested individual faces a civil consequence. In
any individual case, a prosecutor may well be indifferent to whether an innocent defendant faces a significant noncriminal penalty as the result of an arrest.
Indeed, a prosecutor may seek harsher penalties if she is aware that the criminal
defendant lacks immigration status or lives in public housing. Eagly has
demonstrated that some prosecutors’ offices take exactly this approach in the
immigration context. 202 Criminal prosecutors in Maricopa County, Arizona, for
instance, not only are less likely to exercise discretion if they are aware that a
defendant does not have lawful immigration status, but in fact deliberately seek
to structure prosecutions and plea agreements so as to maximize the likelihood
of deportation. 203
Similarly, a jury could determine that an arrested noncitizen is not guilty of
the charged criminal offense, but also believe, as a separate matter, that the
noncitizen should be deported. A juror who believes that prison time is too
harsh a punishment for the alleged offense might simultaneously believe that
the arrested individual should not remain in her job, take in foster children, or
live in a publicly subsidized apartment.
The question of whether conflict arises in any given case depends in part
on the local law enforcement agency’s own priorities. For instance, in the im202. See generally Eagly, supra note 18 (examining three prosecutors’ offices with regard to their approach to immigration status, and arguing that they have distinct approaches
to immigration status: alienage neutral, illegal-alien punishment, and immigration enforcement).
203. Id. at 1180-90.
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migration context, does the agency actively seek to deport unauthorized noncitizens, or does it place primary emphasis on encouraging noncitizens to come
forward and report crime? In the housing context, does a prosecutor’s office
prioritize obtaining evictions as well as convictions—or is it indifferent to
whether a conviction will affect public housing eligibility? Depending on the
locality, police departments and prosecutors’ offices have reached very different answers to these questions.
In some cases, use of arrest information outside the criminal justice system
can undermine the integrity of the criminal justice process and counter important criminal law enforcement aims. It can erode a community’s willingness
to trust and cooperate with the police. Cultivating community cooperation is a
persistent challenge for local law enforcement, particularly when minority
communities are disproportionately arrested and have negative views of the
criminal justice system. 204 Between 2006 and 2010, over half of all violent
crimes—about 3.4 million a year—were not reported to the police. 205
Criminal law actors vary in how they respond to these challenges. Some
police departments and prosecutors’ offices ignore minor crime or seek minimal punishment because they find existing criminal penalties to be unnecessarily harsh and unfair. 206 When actors outside the criminal justice system attach
significant consequences to arrests—particularly unjustified and petty arrests—
they risk disrupting criminal law actors’ efforts to reach out to communities,
cultivate witnesses, and tailor criminal law enforcement to community concerns. 207

204. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social
Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173,
218 (2008) (discussing procedural justice and fairness in perceptions of the police); Jason
Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public
Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 518 (2003) (discussing the need for community cooperation with policing).
205. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Nearly 3.4 Million Violent Crimes per
Year Went Unreported to Police from 2006 to 2010 (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/press/vnrp0610pr.cfm.
206. Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community Prosecutor: Questions of
Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 297 (2012) (describing some prosecutors as concerned with considerations about “whether [a] particular punishment would fit
the crime and whether the ends of the criminal process can be adequately served without a
conviction or imprisonment”); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 14, at 636 (discussing how police can choose to ignore certain low-level offenses); see also Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 704 (2011) (“[T]he central goal of any
system of law enforcement is to promote the right level of deterrence as efficiently as possible.”).
207. For this reason, some prosecutors publicly support laws that would expunge criminal records, reasoning that criminal records should not serve as a bar to reentry after a prison
term has been completed. See, e.g., Letter from Pa. Dist. Att’ys Ass’n to Senate Appropriations Comm. (June 14, 2013) (“For ex-offenders, a criminal record can be a serious barrier to
obtaining gainful employment and resuming life as a law-abiding citizen. Prosecutors recognize that it is important that these individuals be able to find a job once they have paid their
debt to society.”); see also Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV.

850

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:809

Conflict may be particularly problematic from a law enforcement perspective when civil actors attach an undesired consequence to arrest, and that consequence is perceived by community members to be directly and causally related to the arrest. Conflict can change the deterrent effects of criminal law enenforcement, particularly in a way that erodes a community’s willingness to
cooperate with the police. Suppose an exploitative employer hires undocumented workers and then reports those who complain about wage theft to the police.
If a local law enforcement agency prioritizes wage theft over unauthorized employment, the civil immigration decision effectively undermines the criminal
law enforcement priority because the arrest itself may lead to deportation. 208
Similar outcomes arise in the domestic violence context, particularly where police have mandatory arrest policies that result in the arrest of both the victim
and the alleged perpetrator. 209
The noncriminal use of arrests can be particularly problematic when it creates public policy outcomes that undermine the integrity of the criminal justice
system. I consider four important dynamics below: the systemic penalization of
crime victims; the systemic penalization of those who are subject to false arrests; the disruption of important mechanisms of police oversight; and the lack
of transparency and accountability with regard to the causal consequences of an
arrest.
1. Crime victims
Some of the most troubling cases of conflict arise when a crime victim faces a severe penalty as a result of her decision to report crime. Consider the case
of Ruth Holiday, who was evicted after her son, Stanley, broke into her home.
Holiday had previously obtained multiple orders of protection against Stanley,
and she called the police when he arrived. 210 She eventually received police
assistance, but not before Stanley broke through two doors and forced his way
inside. 211 After the attack, Holiday pressed charges. The police report listed her
as the victim, but also erroneously indicated that Stanley lived in Holiday’s
apartment. 212

553, 582-83 (2013) (discussing how criminal prosecutors may find that the risk of deportation undermines their efforts to cultivate trust and cooperation with immigrant communities).
208. Stephen Lee, Workplace Enforcement Workarounds, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
549, 564 (2012) (providing case studies of exploitative employers who reported undocumented workers to local police).
209. Kittrie, supra note 22, at 1451; Shankar Vedantam, Destined for Deportation?,
WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2010), http://wapo.st/1IL4jUV (discussing a Secure Communities
identification of a domestic violence victim who was subject to a detainer after calling the
police).
210. Holiday v. Franco, 709 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (App. Div. 2000).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Three weeks later, Holiday received an eviction notice stating that she was
in breach of her lease because Stanley, who was described as an “unauthorized
occupant,” had been arrested and found with drugs. 213 (Stanley was carrying
cocaine when he broke into the apartment—a fact that had been noted in the
police report.)
Like most public housing tenants, Holiday did not have a lawyer, and she
appeared pro se at the eviction proceeding. 214 She then waived her right to go
forward with the hearing, and instead stipulated to a one-year probation of her
tenancy, to unannounced inspections, and to permanently bar Stanley from entry. 215 One year later, unannounced inspectors found Stanley in the apartment. 216 According to Holiday, Stanley’s presence came as a surprise. Two of
her children—neither of whom lived in the apartment—admitted him without
her knowledge while she was at work. 217 But she was in breach of the stipulation and was evicted. 218
Holiday’s eviction represents a failure of the criminal justice system. If local law enforcement officers want to encourage victims to come forward and
report crime, they must protect those who do so from retaliation. In Holiday’s
case, the eviction—following closely after her call to the police, and citing details found in the police report—functioned as a retaliatory penalty, one that
would deter a similarly situated individual from calling the police or filing a
police report in the future.
But from the public housing perspective, Holiday was considered an eviction priority. Crime in public housing is a serious problem. 219 A landlord could
view Holiday as an undesirable tenant because she might always be a magnet
for Stanley. 220 And as HUD itself has recognized, landlords routinely evict
domestic violence victims who call the police or whose abusers cause property
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 524-25.
Id.
Id. The Housing Authority’s eviction was eventually overturned after Holiday filed
a lawsuit in state court. In a pre-Rucker decision, the court held that Holiday’s particular circumstances shocked the conscience. The court emphasized her absence of a criminal record,
her twenty-year tenancy, her efforts to enforce the protective order against Stanley, the presence of a disabled child in the household, and the fact that for her, public housing was a
home of “last resort.” Id. at 526.
219. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127 (2002) (discussing
congressional findings of violence in public housing); Mireya Navarro & Joseph Goldstein,
Policing the Projects of New York City, at a Hefty Price, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/27/nyregion/policing-the-projects-of-new-york-city-at-a-hefty
-price.html (reporting that in 2013, twenty percent of New York City’s violent crimes took
place in public housing projects, which house about five percent of city residents).
220. Cf. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117, 117-18 (2012)
(finding that nearly one-third of nuisance property citations in Milwaukee during a two-year
period originated in domestic violence incidents).
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
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damage 221—although such evictions can run afoul of antidiscrimination laws,
the Violence Against Women Act, and HUD’s own regulatory guidelines.222
Landlords may believe that tenants like Holiday are unlikely to succeed in
keeping disruptive relatives away, and that it is therefore better to replace them
with others from a long waitlist. 223
The criminal/noncriminal law interaction in Holiday’s case magnifies the
effect of contact with the criminal justice system. Holiday was forced to cede
significant privacy interests by agreeing to unannounced home inspections.
Additionally, the stipulation will remain in effect after the criminal justice process is complete, and regardless of whether Stanley is rehabilitated and becomes a source of support for his mother. Hector Monsegur, who was permanently barred from his mother’s housing complex after completing his sentence
for a drug-related felony, described the lasting effect of his arrest this way:
“The courts let me do seven [years], but with them, it’s one strike and they give
me life.” 224
2. Unlawful arrests
Noncriminal justice actors can undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system when they attach consequences to false arrests. Consider the case of
Charles Bradley, a lead plaintiff in a recent stop-and-frisk class action in New
York City. Bradley, who worked as a security guard, was unlawfully arrested
for trespass while on his way to visit his fiancée. 225 Bradley’s arrest was demonstrably false; there was no probable cause. The arresting officer—who had
a history of lying within the scope of his employment, and who admitted to
having previously written a false summons to “help a friend”—also gave con221. Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Enforcement & Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to FHEO Office Dirs. & FHEO Regional Dirs.,
Assessing Claims of Housing Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence Under
the Fair Housing Act (FHAct) and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) (Feb. 9,
2011), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/library/11-domestic-violence-memo
-with-attachment.pdf (acknowledging pervasive problems with the eviction of crime victims
from public housing, with victims being evicted “after repeated calls to the police for domestic violence incidents” and because of “property damage caused by their abusers”); see also
Lapidus, supra note 23, at 381 (discussing how zero-tolerance or one-strike housing policies
have a disparate impact on women).
222. Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 221.
223. Id. at 6-7 (discussing evictions where landlords believe that a tenant will be unable
to prevent a domestic abuser from disrupting the property); see also Meister v. Kan. City,
Kan. Hous. Auth., No. 09-2544-EFM, 2011 WL 765887, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011) (noting that an eviction notice cited a domestic violence police report); Bouley v. YoungSabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (D. Vt. 2005) (“It is undisputed that, less than 72 hours
after the plaintiff’s husband assaulted her, the defendant attempted to evict her [on the basis
of breaching the lease].”).
224. Manny Fernandez, Barred from Public Housing, Even to See Family, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/nyregion/01banned.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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tradictory and implausible testimony about Bradley’s arrest. 226 In particular,
his testimony materially contradicted his arrest paperwork. 227
Because Bradley worked as a security guard, the arrest was automatically
shared with the authority that issued his security guard license. In order to keep
his license, Bradley was required to provide documentation of the status of his
prosecution within a month of his arrest. 228
In Bradley’s case, the checks on the criminal justice system ultimately
worked. The prosecutor agreed to drop the charges after Bradley’s fiancée provided evidence that he was her invited guest. His public defender advocated on
his behalf with the prosecutor and with his licensing authority. 229 The licensing
authority agreed to an extension, and the prosecutor dropped the charges before
his license was suspended.
The outcome in Bradley’s case was by some measures a success. The prosecutor made a reasoned judgment not to proceed, which allowed Bradley to
avoid a license suspension. But obtaining this result required working against
significant organizational barriers—ones that might well be insurmountable for
the typical arrested individual in Bradley’s situation. First, the arrested individual may be alone in attempting to negotiate with a licensing agency. Criminal
defense attorneys—particularly public defenders with heavy caseloads—face
significant pressure to prioritize their work on criminal dockets. Relatively few
defendants are able to obtain free legal assistance in negotiating civil consequences related to arrests.
Arrested individuals who attempt to mitigate civil consequences face significant constraints. A typical arrested individual in Bradley’s situation would
have no information from the criminal court that would allow him to demonstrate that his arrest was baseless. In the short window Bradley was initially
given to explain his arrest, he had no opportunity to take the police officer’s
testimony or review his arrest paperwork, much less access the officer’s disciplinary history. In fact, a typical defendant in Bradley’s circumstances might
not have ever received a criminal complaint. Bradley was given a Desk Appearance Ticket after his arrest—a time-saving mechanism that allows an arrested individual to be released after booking, rather than waiting for arraignment. 230 The arraignment occurs at the first court appearance, often scheduled
months later. But because the arrested individual does not have a criminal
complaint that describes the circumstances of the arrest, he has limited ability
to demonstrate to an employer that the charges are minor or unjustified.

226. Id. at 498-99.
227. Id.
228. Complaint at 29, Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478 (No. 12-cv-02274), 2012 WL

1031760.

229. A Plaintiff Reflects on Judge Scheindlin’s Clean Halls Decision, BRONX DEFEND(Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.bronxdefenders.org/a-plaintiff-reflects-on-judge-scheindlins
-clean-halls-decision.
230. See N.Y.C. CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 41, at 10.

ERS

854

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:809

These dynamics raise the stakes of an arrest, separate and apart from how
that arrest is treated in the criminal justice system. Such interactions can significantly undermine a community’s willingness to trust and cooperate with police. For arrested individuals, arrest decisions and their causal consequences are
often not clear-cut. Police officers are the most visible government actors that
certain communities encounter, and they are the ones likely to face legitimacy
consequences if a community perceives the civil consequences of arrests to be
excessively harsh or unfair. This possibility is particularly pronounced in communities where residents live close together, such as in immigrant enclaves or
in large public housing complexes. 231
3. Regulation of police
Noncriminal consequences of arrests can undermine the ability of law enforcement officers to regulate policing decisions. An arrest needs only a single
police officer’s determination of probable cause. When a police officer makes
an arrest that is perceived as unfair or unjustified, other criminal justice actors
have the ability—and an obligation—to dismiss that arrest. Prosecutors, in particular, wield significant oversight through charging discretion. 232 Prosecutors’
enforcement choices can reflect their reasoned determination that an arrest
lacks factual support, that the law is too harsh, or that “the application of that
law to a particular defendant or in a particular context would be unwise or unfair.” 233

231. TASK FORCE ON SECURE CMTYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (2011) (“When communities perceive that police are enforcing federal immigration laws, especially if there is a perception that such enforcement is targeting minor offenders, that trust is broken in some communities, and victims, witnesses and other
residents may become fearful of reporting crime or approaching the police to exchange information.”).
232. Barkow, supra note 70, at 1048 (“The prosecutor acts with discretion that is almost
unmatched anywhere in law.”); see also Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel
and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1599-600
(2005) (describing prosecutors as playing an important screening function, one that is more
rigorous when they are detached from an investigation).
233. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1252
(2011) (characterizing “‘prosecutorial nullification[]’ as those circumstances in which a
prosecutor has sufficient evidence to secure a conviction against a defendant for conduct that
violates a criminal law, but declines prosecution because of a disagreement with that law or
because of the belief that the application of that law to a particular defendant or in a particular context would be unwise or unfair”); see also Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679-80 (1995) (discussing nullification in the context of juries).
Prosecutors, of course, may decline to prosecute for other reasons as well, such as their
pragmatic calculation that the evidence is insufficient to persuade a jury, or the crime is not
significant enough to warrant taking resources away from another prosecution.
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To the extent police officers regulate their behavior based on how arrest information is used, 234 police may behave differently if they are aware that arrests will be used for a civil purpose, even if they are not used for a criminal
law enforcement purpose. For instance, police officers with the goal of detecting unauthorized immigrants may be more likely to engage in unlawful searches and seizures if they expect that those searches will reveal immigration documents that will be admissible in removal proceedings, regardless of whether
prosecutions will proceed in criminal court. 235
Hiroshi Motomura makes a related point, describing criminal prosecutors
as having a “tempering” effect on police activity. 236 When officers see that
their arrests do not result in prosecution, Motomura argues, they modify their
arrest behavior. Prosecutors thus exert a tempering effect on arrest decisions by
giving cues about what types of arrests are worthwhile. But police officers who
view immigration enforcement as part of their mission might view deportation
as a “tangible result that makes the arrest worthwhile,” regardless of the outcome in criminal court. 237 Thus, police may have more of an incentive to ignore the cues of criminal prosecutors if they perceive deportation as an alternative way of achieving law enforcement goals.
4. Transparency
Regulatory conflict can also inject additional opacity into the management
of arrests, preventing arrested individuals from understanding which consequences are imposed by the criminal justice system and which are imposed by
other parties. Criminal justice outcomes, of course, are already shaped by a
number of factors that are outside the control of an arrested individual. Factors
such as the priorities of the local prosecutor’s office, the quality of defense
counsel, and whether a case proceeds in state or federal court can play a significant role in how any particular defendant is treated. 238

234. Prosecutorial discretion may matter more in terms of setting long-term departmental priorities, rather than governing any individual police officer’s behavior. See Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
363, 377-78 (“[T]he sociological literature strongly suggests that the primary goal of officers
in the field in the average case is to get a ‘collar.’ If they do, they’ve done their job. It is the
prosecutor’s job to convict.” (footnotes omitted)).
235. See David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine,
91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 35 (2012).
236. Motomura, supra note 17, at 1847.
237. Id. at 1843-47.
238. Writing about the choice of federal or state jurisdiction, Sara Sun Beale argues that
“[d]ual jurisdiction means that offenders are subject to a kind of cruel lottery, in which a
small minority of the persons who commit a particular offense is . . . subjected to much
harsher sentences—and often to significantly less favorable procedural or substantive standards—than persons prosecuted for parallel state offenses.” Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and
Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction,
46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 997 (1995).
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Noncriminal justice actors who attach causal consequences to arrests can
magnify the sense that criminal justice outcomes are not transparent, and can
obscure the work that the criminal justice system is doing.
Assuming that an arrested individual has legal representation, the criminal
defense attorney can explain to her client how her case will proceed if prosecuted in state versus federal court. But a criminal defense attorney may not be
aware of, much less able to explain or negotiate, noncriminal justice consequences stemming from arrests. As a result, arrested individuals may view their
postarrest outcomes as a “cruel lottery,” 239 but hold the arresting police officers
or police department responsible for the causal consequences of the arrest, regardless of whether the police have any knowledge or control over what follows.
IV. EXERCISING OVERSIGHT OVER THE USE OF ARRESTS
Arrests have significant consequences outside of the criminal justice system. How should those consequences be regulated? Although police and prosecutors have enormous power to enforce the criminal law, their powers are constrained by the Constitution. Even when criminal procedure falls short—failing
to give arrested individuals the right to a speedy day in court, adequate legal
representation, and a meaningful opportunity to understand and contest the
charges against them—it provides a yardstick for understanding how arrests
should be used in the criminal justice system, and how they should not. But
outside the criminal law context, similar standards do not apply, even though
the stakes may be much higher for the arrested individual.
Much work remains to be done in understanding how and when arrests
should trigger regulatory decisions. Noncriminal justice actors do not necessarily need to apply standards that are congruent to those of criminal procedure.
Criminal law’s use of arrests differs from that of other actors in important
ways. For one, noncriminal justice actors do not need to evaluate arrests at all.
They rely on arrests because arrest data are readily available and because they
regard arrests as a proxy for information they value—but not because arrests
are necessary to making regulatory decisions. Noncriminal justice actors also
have incentives to focus on their own priorities when using arrest information,
rather than seeking more broadly to combat crime.
Since noncriminal justice actors use arrests to achieve their own objectives,
in practice, back-end administrative discretion provides a valuable way to manage the effects of arrests. This Part evaluates administrative discretion as a conflict-mediating tool, and argues that it is inadequate alone as a regulatory strategy. Administrative discretion can fail to mitigate some of the most serious
noncriminal consequences of arrests. This Part assesses administrative discretion as a regulatory strategy, and preliminarily explores other alternatives, in-

239. Id.

April 2015]

ARRESTS AS REGULATION

857

cluding restricting how arrest information is used, and putting in place other
oversight mechanisms.
A. Administrative Discretion and Its Limits
Noncriminal law actors necessarily exercise administrative discretion when
they use arrest information. Discretion can be individualized—where civil authorities make a back-end determination about how to proceed in a given
case—or it can be systemic, where agencies set general enforcement priorities. 240 For instance, in the immigration context, general guidelines that prioritize the deportation of those with criminal convictions reflect systemic discretion. Whether to deport any particular noncitizen—taking into account factors
such as whether the noncitizen is considered an administrative priority and
whether mitigating circumstances, such as the presence of U.S. family ties,
counsel in favor of exercising discretion—reflects individualized discretion.
Discretionary enforcement decisions are context-specific. In the context of
immigration enforcement, authorities must determine whether a noncitizen is
legally removable, and then decide on a discretionary basis whether to proceed
with deportation. In the context of public housing and licensing, the arrested
individual has a legal entitlement to remain in her home or retain her license,
and is entitled to due process before an eviction or a license revocation. The arrest serves as the starting point for a fact-based legal inquiry: Is the arrested individual in breach of her lease agreement, or has she met the criteria for a license revocation? After making a threshold legal determination, noncriminal
law authorities also take into account equitable considerations. Public housing
authorities exercise equitable discretion by looking at factors such as the seriousness of the offense, who would be affected by eviction, and whether there
are other alternatives to achieving a similar result (for instance, whether the
household is willing to bar the arrested individual from entry). 241
Like unauthorized immigrants, at-will employees who lack legal entitlements to remain in their jobs can be removed at any time. Employers who rely
on arrests may take into account equitable factors when deciding whether to
240. See Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611,
612-18 (2006) (distinguishing between rule-based discretion and administrative discretion).
Motomura makes a similar distinction between macro-discretion (“when agencies and officials set enforcement priorities and support them with funds”) and micro-discretion (“when
agencies and officials decide whether or not to pursue the removal of a noncitizen after she
has been identified as . . . removable”). HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE
LAW 129 (2014).
241. Letter from Michael M. Liu to Pub. Hous. Dirs., supra note 151; cf. Letter from
Shaun Donovan, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., and Carol J. Galante, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Hous.—Fed. Hous. Comm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to Private
Owners & Agents of HUD-Assisted Properties (n.d.), available at http://nhlp.org/files/HUD
%20Letter%203.14.12.pdf (calling on landlords to set discretionary admission policies that
balance the need for safety against the interests of allowing family reunification when considering admission of those with criminal records).
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take adverse employment action, such as the length of the employee’s service.
But they may place equal or greater weight on factors such as how easy the
worker is to replace and the cost of conducting an inquiry.
Across the board, administrative discretion plays an important role in mediating the consequences of an arrest. Courts also attach significance to administrative discretion. In Rucker, the existence of back-end discretion itself—
regardless of whether discretion was actually applied in practice—played a key
role in the Court’s decision to uphold the one-strike eviction policy. 242 Similarly, the Supreme Court emphasized the role of discretionary authority in its 2012
decision upholding one portion of Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 immigration
law. 243 The absence of discretion has likewise been central to decisions striking
down certain mandatory consequences based on arrests. 244
Administrative discretion thus plays an important role in mediating the
consequences of arrests. But administrative discretion alone is inadequate to
avoid the most problematic instances of regulatory conflict. One persistent critique of administrative discretion is that it is prone to error, or applied inconsistently or unfairly. 245 Administrative agencies may not rigorously examine
facts that counsel in favor of discretion. In the housing context, domestic violence victims or those who are charged with only minor crimes have been
evicted or denied access to housing, despite HUD guidance to the contrary. 246
242. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 133-34 (2002).
243. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). In upholding the portion of

the law that authorized police officers to verify immigration status during the course of a
stop or arrest—known colloquially as the “papers please” provision—Justice Alito’s separate
opinion emphasized that even if Arizona police officers conducted immigration checks, the
federal government ultimately retained the discretion over whether to act on that information. Id. at 2526-27 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“At bottom, the
discretion that ultimately matters is not whether to verify a person’s immigration status but
whether to act once the person’s status is known. . . . [T]he Federal Government retains the
discretion that matters most—that is, the discretion to enforce the law in particular cases.”);
see also MOTOMURA, supra note 240, at 130 (discussing the importance of federal immigration enforcement discretion to the holding in Arizona v. United States). For a discussion of
the Court’s preemption analysis with respect to this provision of S.B. 1070, see Kerry
Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 626-32 (2013).
244. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 736, 740 (S.D. Ohio
2000) (striking down a law banning persons from entering “drug exclusion zones” for ninety
days following a drug-related arrest, in part because there was no “case-by-case” determination by courts over whether the individual ought to be excluded); State ex rel. Okla. State
Bureau of Investigation v. Warren, 975 P.2d 900, 904 (Okla. 1998) (striking down a licensing law that banned applying for a concealed weapons permit for three years after certain
arrests, based in part on the blanket nature of the ban).
245. This is particularly true when enforcement agencies rely on private actors and others to conduct front-line screening. See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1109-10 (2009) (arguing that instead of exercising regulatory discretion, employers who are delegated immigration enforcement authority instead
collude with undocumented workers and selectively report those who complain of labor violations).
246. See, e.g., Carey, supra note 131, at 567-68 (discussing public housing denials for
nonviolent crime, such as writing bad checks).
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Likewise, advocates point to U.S. citizens who have been wrongly placed in
removal proceedings. 247
But assuming that noncriminal justice actors make a sustained effort to enforce their own administrative priorities, back-end discretion alone still falls
short. As a regulatory strategy, back-end discretion privileges the interests of
the noncriminal justice actor over others. Noncriminal law enforcement officials may have an institutional interest in collecting a broad swath of information, even when they are aware that the arrest may be inaccurate or insignificant. They then use their own discretionary process to selectively target certain
arrested individuals. This approach may benefit the civil actor by providing the
most flexibility. Local law enforcement agencies, on the other hand, may value
a system of front-end rules. Prosecutors and other criminal law actors may value the ability to tell community members with certainty that an arrest alone will
not lead to deportation, eviction, or employment consequences.
Second, the exercise of back-end administrative discretion can be exceedingly opaque. Measured in terms of transparency—“the ease with which the
public can discern both the outcome of legal decisions and the inputs that lead
to such decisions” 248—administrative agencies can provide minimal transparency of process. “Transparency of process depends on the ability of the public
to know that an issue is being considered, to be involved in the decisionmaking
process, to know who else is involved and in what ways, and to understand how
a final decision is reached.” 249 Administrative agencies that rely on arrests vary
greatly in terms of their openness; some provide publicly accessible statistics
about their enforcement choices, while others do not. 250 There is even less accountability for private actors, such as employers, who rely on arrest information.
Accurate information about how arrests are used can thus be difficult to
find, particularly when arrested individuals have no legal counsel. And even the
presence of legal counsel may do little to mitigate the effects of an arrest outside the criminal justice system. Criminal defense attorneys now have an obligation to advise their clients about certain civil consequences of criminal convictions 251 but face no similar constitutional obligation to advise clients about
the consequences of an arrest alone. On a practical level, when criminal defense

247. See, e.g., Esha Bhandari, Yes, the U.S. Wrongfully Deports Its Own Citizens, AM.
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION BLOG RTS. (Apr. 25, 2013, 11:48 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog
/immigrants-rights/yes-us-wrongfully-deports-its-own-citizens (discussing U.S. citizens mistakenly identified for removal through Secure Communities); William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine, NEW YORKER (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013
/04/29/the-deportation-machine.
248. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1949 (2008).
249. Id.
250. For instance, ICE publishes data on Secure Communities removals, while HUD
does not provide comparable statistics about how many evictions follow from arrest reports.
251. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010).
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attorneys voluntarily assume the additional work of attempting to negotiate
noncriminal consequences, they may have no access to timely, relevant information that will allow them to engage in effective advocacy.
Likewise, some arrested individuals may only have knowledge of the ultimate regulatory decision, such as license suspension, deportation, or eviction,
but have no knowledge about the process that led to that decision, other than
the fact of their arrest. Regulatory opacity can undermine strategic decisions
made by law enforcement officers, particularly decisions designed to encourage
immigrant crime victims and witnesses to come forward.
Third, the efficacy of back-end discretion is constrained by idiosyncratic
timing and procedure. Even when immigration enforcement officials and others
are willing to exercise discretion in favor of crime victims, witnesses, or the
wrongfully arrested, they may face persistent barriers to gathering timely information. An arrested individual might be deported before he has a meaningful
opportunity to demonstrate that he was wrongfully arrested. And as Bradley’s
case demonstrates, license suspension or other consequences may occur before
any meaningful activity has taken place in the criminal justice process.
Fourth, even if noncriminal actors exercise back-end discretion, they continue to delegate front-end enforcement discretion to police officers. Noncriminal justice actors who rely on arrests do not screen a random population; they
screen those whom local law enforcement officers decide to arrest. These dynamics magnify the effects of relatively minor policing decisions on the poor
and on racial minorities, who are the most likely to be arrested. 252 By relying
on arrests, noncriminal justice actors exacerbate the racial and class-based dynamics that undergird arrest decisions.
Finally, knowledge of the arrest itself can skew how noncriminal justice
actors exercise discretion. In the immigration context, Motomura develops a
thoughtful analysis of how delegating enforcement discretion to police officers
shapes immigration enforcement decisions. Motomura writes: “[A]n individual
unauthorized migrant’s chances of arrest are very low. Once arrested, however,
the chances are high that the federal government will move to deport or even
criminally prosecute. Arrest discretion has by far the greatest effect on outcomes.” 253 Motomura estimates that of unauthorized migrants who are arrested, sixty-five to ninety-five percent are prosecuted and forced to depart. 254
252. Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE
L.J. 2176, 2183 (2013) (“The spaces that poor people, especially poor African Americans,
live in receive more law enforcement in the form of police stops and arrests.”); Howell, supra note 14, at 291 (“[A]bout 86% of people arrested for misdemeanors in New York City in
the years 2000-2005 were nonwhite. About 48-50% were reported to be black and another
32-34% Hispanic.” (footnote omitted)); Motomura, supra note 17, at 1857 (discussing how
racial profiling can skew immigration policies that rely on arrests); Pinard, supra note 29, at
967-68 (noting that African Americans and Latinos are disproportionately arrested); Smyth,
supra note 199, at 58 (citing statistics that approximately ninety percent of indigent defendants in the Bronx, New York, are African American or Latino).
253. MOTOMURA, supra note 240, at 130.
254. Id.
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The discretion to arrest has thus been “the discretion that matters” in immigration removal decisions. 255 This trend can be explained in light of immigration enforcement officials’ institutional concerns. When immigration enforcement officials select which unauthorized noncitizens to remove, they decide
from a caseload that has already been shaped by arrest decisions. 256 Once immigration enforcement officials are made aware of the presence of an unauthorized noncitizen, they also have important institutional incentives to proceed
with deportation. It is one thing for immigration enforcement officials not to
proactively invest resources in finding and deporting some subset of the nation’s 11.1 million unauthorized noncitizens; it is another to ignore those who
have been arrested and actively brought to the attention of immigration enforcement officials. When immigration officials ignore an arrested unauthorized immigrant, they run the risk of backlash, particularly if that noncitizen is
subsequently arrested for another reason. 257
Other actors face similar concerns. For instance, an employer who is aware
of a worker’s arrest—particularly a worker who operates independently much
of the time, such as a home health care worker or a taxi driver—may face a
heightened risk of liability if it knew of an employee’s arrest and ignored signs
that the employee was potentially negligent or otherwise posed a risk. 258 Backend administrative discretion thus does not operate independently of the arrest
decision; arrest information channels and narrows the grounds for exercising
discretion.
B. Other Policy Alternatives
Once noncriminal justice actors are aware of arrests, they face significant
pressures to take adverse actions. At the same time, they often receive inadequate information to allow for the meaningful exercise of equitable discretion.
That raises the question of whether arrest information should be broadly accessible to noncriminal justice actors, particularly for minor subfelony arrests.
While the appropriate use and regulation of arrest information is a considerably
broad topic that cannot be adequately explored here, I raise two possibilities for
how to create more transparency and procedural fairness in the use of arrest information. First, arrest sharing itself can be restricted. Second, other actors,
such as criminal defense attorneys, prosecutors, or independent third parties,

255. Motomura, supra note 17, at 1822, 1833-34 (arguing that arrest discretion plays a
key role in shaping deportation decisions).
256. MOTOMURA, supra note 240, at 231.
257. Id. (“[O]nce state or local officers identify and detain an unauthorized migrant, any
federal decision not to seek removal will prompt much more political exposure and criticism
than the systemic, macro-level discretionary federal decisions that make arrests more or less
likely in the first place.”).
258. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 10, at 36 (discussing the
role of negligent hiring torts in leading employers to rely on background checks).
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can make concerted efforts to evaluate and address the noncriminal uses of arrests.
1. Restrict arrest sharing
The simplest way to address the effects of arrests outside the criminal justice system is to limit arrest sharing, including by automatically expunging arrests immediately after charges are dropped, and by restricting the dissemination of open arrest information outside of the criminal justice system. Today,
precisely because arrest records are disseminated widely and stored in a number of databases, regulatory agencies and private actors who want to access arrest information generally have a number of options for obtaining it. 259 Arrest
information can be obtained directly from criminal justice agencies or from
private sources, which may be more prone to error. 260 In states that do not automatically seal arrests that do not result in a conviction, arrest records are
available long after the charges are dismissed, and require considerable effort to
expunge. 261 And even jurisdictions that do automatically expunge arrests do so
at the time of dismissal, 262 which allows arrest information to be shared while
the arrest is open and pending.
Legislators who restrict the use of arrest information will need to react to
the many ways that arrests are used outside the criminal justice sphere. This
will require a willingness to work against a tendency to frame crime in the abstract. As Joseph Kennedy argues, lawmakers tend to think of the most severe
forms of crime, rather than examining how an arrest may affect an “ordinary”
arrested individual. 263 They are also unlikely to consider how arrests alone can
lead to adverse consequences that outstrip any penalties imposed by the criminal justice system. Lawmakers who pay greater attention to how arrest information is actually transmitted, and to whether arrested individuals have meaningful opportunities to respond, may well choose to restrict the noncriminal
uses of arrests, even though doing so may mean denying noncriminal justice
actors access to information that they believe is relevant and valuable for their
own decisionmaking.

259. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 71, at 210-11.
260. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 2 (noting that most private employers

conduct background searches through private enterprises or through commercial databases
that aggregate criminal records that are available to the public from government agencies).
261. See, e.g., SHARON M. DIETRICH, CMTY. LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA., EEOC’S CRIMINAL RECORD GUIDANCE ONE YEAR LATER: LESSONS FROM THE COMMUNITY 4-5 (2013).
262. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50 (McKinney 2014) (requiring that dismissed criminal charges be sealed).
263. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (2000) (arguing that when people consider
crime in the abstract, they focus on the worst offenders, rather than understanding that
crimes are also defined in a way that encompasses relatively minor behavior).
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Because arrest information is already widely available, thoughtful commentators question whether it is viable at this point to restrict arrest sharing. 264
There are, however, important examples where arrest information has been
sealed and the identities of arrested individuals have been protected. Juvenile
records provide one precedent. While sealing in the juvenile context is imperfect—with exceptions for educational providers and others—it provides an important example of lawmakers choosing to protect the identities of arrested individuals from widespread dissemination, notwithstanding potential benefits
from disclosure. 265
Short of restricting the use of arrests, lawmakers can also promote transparency with how arrest information is used and stored. Even limited changes—such as timely disclosures about how and when arrest information is disseminated—may help arrested individuals and their counsel have more
meaningful opportunities to contest the facts of their arrests. Greater transparency about the effects of arrests will also promote accountability and may
prompt noncriminal justice actors to more narrowly tailor their use of arrests.
Lawmakers can also encourage or mandate that noncriminal actors provide
publicly available and easily accessible information about their use of arrests,
including information about what types of arrest charges will be evaluated, the
purpose and timing of the evaluation, the relevant decisionmakers, and any appeals process. 266
2. Exercise oversight
Another way to mitigate the noncriminal consequences of arrests is for
other actors, either within or outside of the criminal justice system, to exercise
oversight over the effects of arrests.
Criminal defense attorneys are an obvious choice. Some defense attorneys
already make efforts to attempt to inform defendants of how their arrest may be
used outside of the criminal context. 267 A number of organizations encourage
defense attorneys to engage in systemic efforts to address noncriminal consequences, and provide resources to help them do so. 268 Interventions by defense
attorneys can be an important way to mitigate some adverse consequences of
264. See, e.g., Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 71, at 211 (arguing that it is now too late to
place confidence in policies designed to limit access to criminal records, because “[t]he informational infrastructure is too large, too entrenched, and too useful to too many people to
make its contraction even a remote possibility”).
265. See generally Henning, supra note 183, at 522-24 (discussing juvenile arrest sealing, its motivation, and certain exceptions in public housing and education).
266. For a discussion of these types of changes in the context of criminal convictions,
see NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 10, at 30-42, 54.
267. See, e.g., Smyth, supra note 13, at 480 (providing a roadmap for how criminal defense attorneys can advise clients about collateral consequences and seek outcomes that mitigate their effects).
268. See, e.g., BRONX DEFENDERS, supra note 87, at 9; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, supra note 13, at 62.
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arrests. In Bradley’s case, for instance, his defense attorney played a critical
role in preventing his license suspension while his criminal case was proceeding. 269 But defense attorneys also face significant barriers to attempting to address the consequences of arrests. They frequently lack access to relevant information that would allow them to understand how an arrest might impact an
arrested individual’s job or housing situation. And defense attorneys who are
already vastly overburdened with criminal caseloads have limited ability to attempt to mitigate noncriminal consequences. 270
Another possibility is for criminal prosecutors to play a larger role in evaluating the consequences of arrests outside the criminal justice system. Prosecutors already evaluate cases and make determinations about whether an arrest is
justified. They may also have an ethical duty in some cases to work with
wrongfully arrested individuals to mitigate the noncriminal consequences of
their arrests.
One change that prosecutors’ offices can make is to evaluate arrests relatively early and dismiss meritless arrests. 271 Prosecutors have the ethical obligation to seek justice, rather than to routinely pursue convictions. 272 But prosecutors also have strong competing institutional incentives to focus narrowly on
the work of seeking convictions or, more routinely, seeking plea bargains.
Prosecutors have professional incentives to collect “wins,” 273 and some prosecutors perceive it to be in their interest to book suspects and to keep an arrest
open, even if they ultimately intend to drop the charges prior to trial. 274 Relatively few prosecutors engage in early screening of arrests. 275
Absent external motivation, prosecutors’ offices are more likely to dismiss
cases early if they perceive it to be in their interest to do so. For instance, after
widespread attention to unlawful stops and arrests, the Bronx District Attorney’s Office adopted a default policy of not prosecuting public housing trespass
arrests unless the prosecutor first interviewed the police officer and was satisfied that there was a basis for the charges. 276 Prosecutors designed the policy
after repeatedly determining that police officers engaged in unlawful arrests
269. A Plaintiff Reflects on Judge Scheindlin’s Clean Halls Decision, supra note 229.
270. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 58, at 1096-97 (describing excessive workloads

faced by public defenders).
271. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 29 (2002) (arguing in favor of early prosecutorial screening).
272. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2464, 2470 (2004).
273. Id. at 2471.
274. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 14, at 614, for an argument that prosecutors and
other agents in the criminal justice system use arrest information to monitor arrested individuals over time.
275. Wright & Miller, supra note 271, at 104 (noting that early prosecutorial screening
“run[s] against deep-seated habits and traditions of prosecutors”).
276. Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/nyregion/in-the-bronx-resistance-to
-prosecuting-stop-and-frisk-arrests.html.
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and falsified arrest reports. The interview requirement changes the default result; a case will be dropped unless the prosecutor determines that the officer’s
account is credible. The interview requirement also speeds the process of dismissing cases because the prosecutor must make a charging decision or drop
the charges within forty-eight hours of the arrest.
With this policy, arrest information will still be entered into the law enforcement database and create a criminal record that will be transmitted to other
actors. But the early dismissal can allow arrested individuals to more quickly
demonstrate to an employer or other actor that the arrest was not significant,
and that they should not be suspended or face other adverse action.
Prosecutors can also engage in a more coordinated response with other actors, some of whom implicitly expect prosecutorial cooperation. For instance,
the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission allows suspended taxi
drivers to return to work prior to the dismissal of arrest charges if a prosecutor
explains that the criminal charges will be dropped. 277 Similarly, immigration
enforcement officials implicitly relied on prosecutorial intervention when they
implemented guidelines designed to prevent the deportation of crime victims or
witnesses. 278 This approach combines back-end administrative discretion with
the assumption of prosecutorial intervention; noncriminal justice authorities assume that a prosecutor’s office will provide the information necessary to show
that the arrested individual is entitled to discretion.
This approach, however, has serious flaws. It is not at all clear that prosecutors are willing to reach out to employers, licensing authorities, or immigration officials to explain why that actor should not proceed with its enforcement
decision. Some prosecutors may seek harsher penalties if they are aware of the
noncriminal consequence; they may actively seek deportation or other civil
consequences as a tangible outcome of a prosecution. 279 Similarly, prosecutors
who are aware of a potential noncriminal consequence might view that consequence as an additional leverage point in plea negotiations. Thus, any particular
prosecutor’s willingness to negotiate civil consequences is constrained by how
that prosecutor’s office defines its institutional role.
Prosecutors may be willing to work to mitigate certain consequences when
they have a vested interest in the outcome. For instance, some prosecutors may
make efforts to mitigate civil consequences if a defense attorney asks for intervention as part of plea negotiations and offers something in return. 280 Similarly, if prosecutors have an independent reason to keep in touch with the arrested
individual, such as in the case of an arrestee who becomes a cooperating wit277. See Nnebe v. Daus, 665 F. Supp. 2d 311, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 644 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2011).
278. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs. et al., Prosecutorial Discretion for Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011).
279. See Eagly, supra note 18, at 1180-90.
280. Lee, supra note 207, at 578-80 (offering examples of criminal prosecutors who
took immigration consequences into account during plea negotiations).
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ness, they may make efforts on a case-by-case basis to mitigate the civil consequences of arrests. But in the typical case, a prosecutor may well be unaware of
the civil consequence or unwilling to intervene unless she perceives an immediate institutional interest in doing so. For this approach to be effective, noncriminal justice actors who rely on prosecutorial discretion need to ensure that
prosecutors are willing to fully assess cases and to contact administrative authorities if they choose not to proceed with a prosecution.
Given that neither criminal nor noncriminal justice actors have incentives
to fully consider the effects of arrests outside the criminal justice system, an independent third party tasked with oversight might be a more promising option.
Putting in place reporting requirements to a third party would itself be a significant step forward in promoting transparency and accountability. A third party—one that is not committed to either the goals of criminal law enforcement
actors or to the interests of the noncriminal actor—may be in the best position
to systemically evaluate considerations such as whether the underlying arrest
information is accurate, whether it provides a meaningful informational proxy,
whether it disproportionately affects certain groups, whether the evaluation
process is fair and transparent, and whether the use of arrests has undesirable or
unintended public policy consequences.
CONCLUSION
When actors outside the criminal justice system rely on arrests, they delegate front-end screening discretion to individual police officers and magnify the
effects of arrest decisions. Across a number of spheres, noncriminal justice actors envision regulating particular types of people: they want to find the “criminal alien” who commits felonies; the tenant who deals drugs and makes his
neighbors less safe; the worker who should not be placed in a position of trust;
or the student who poses a risk to herself and to others. Arrests can be a valuable tool in meeting these objectives. But using arrests in this way comes with a
significant cost, as it necessarily reaches well beyond these priorities. When actors outside the criminal justice system look at arrests as a whole, they overwhelmingly examine subfelony arrests and arrests that do not result in conviction. They magnify the effects of underlying and problematic police practices
based on racial profiling. Regulatory decisions based on such arrests can carry
devastating costs for arrested individuals and for the criminal justice system as
a whole.
Noncriminal justice actors who rely on arrests are driven by their own organizational priorities, and they take an instrumental view of arrests—one that
is at odds with the principle that an arrest alone is not indicative of guilt. They
also respond to organizational incentives to conduct broad-based screening,
even if there is no reason to believe that a particular type of arrest will correlate
well with the civil actor’s objectives.
In taking this approach, noncriminal justice actors systemically privilege
their own interests above other important concerns. This creates a compelling
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need to understand how arrests regulate individuals outside the criminal justice
sphere, and to evaluate when and whether it is appropriate to allow an individual police officer’s decision to arrest to do so much work.

